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Although Hong Kong political structure is prominent by
its continuity, this dissertation shows, by an
illustration of housing policies development, that the
nature of the state has undergone significant change at
the turn or the early 1970s. Mainly by carrying out
administrative-rational reforms, the colonial state has
transformed into a capitalist state. It is then argued
that the peculiar way the.state maintains its autonomy
has contributed a lot to the legitimacy which the state
has won in enhancing the particular capitalist
development. Thereby, laissez-faire economic policy
has been able to go hand in hand with the
interventionist approach in providing material
concession to the mass. Changing configuration of the
interest of the state is argued to be the chief
determinant of the transformation, which has
fundamentally altered the rationality of operation of
the state. However, problems of overburdening has
brought about politicization of the administrative
system which is argued to be the major shaping force of
the future political development in Hong Kong.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
It. is a common belief held by both the local residents
and foreigners that Hong Kong is a classic model of laissez-faire
economy and because of which, it is often argued, the success of
Hong Kong is able to sustain. In the light of the main trend of
rolling-back the welfare state in the major developed capitalist
countries, it remains as an enigma as to how and why a successful
'laissez-faire economy would encompass a public housing provision
project which is among the largest in the world.
It poses further problems when one considers the fact
that it has been the public housing provision which provides
issues and organizational opportunities for the oppositional
political activities, and the public housing-estates established
by the colonial government have actually become strongholds of
the burgeoning grassroot political force.
Although the present study is not pretending to provide
all the answers to the above questions, it is argued that a
proper understanding of these seemingly bizarre phenomena can
only be achieved by re-orientating the theoretical perspective,
taking a more coherent framework of social study, locating the
developmental path of Hong Kong into a wider view of the social
and economic setting both of Hong Kong and capitalism as a whole.
The study is mainly theoretical and analytical. The
intention is to have a political sociological inquiry about the
relation between the state and society at a macro-level.
Historical materials, secondary sources and primary government
documents are being made used of, followed by analytical comments
and theoretical abstractions. The aim is to put forward
arguments which are seen as being able to shed new light on the
analysis of the past political development of Hong Kong in
general, and the local urban politics in particular.
Since the focus of study and the explanation is largely
related to the policy-making process as well as the changing nature
of the state, the first chapter would begin by discussing the
general issue of policy-making study and different state
theories. Then in chapter 3, the focus is put on one brand of
Marxist state theory developed by Claus Offe, who is considered
to be able to solve some important theoretical difficulties in
the study of the capitalist state.
The case of Hong Kong housing provision is further
analyzed in different stages in the subsequent chapters.
Contrasts have especially been made between the' 50s-' 60s and
'70s-'80s, the former is considered as the continuation of
colonial state operation, while the later is considered to be the
time when the Hong Kong polity has lapsed into a capitalist state
stage. Structural aspects of the administration which have been
sustaining the functional aspects of the state activities will be
examined to show both the logical and historical dimensions of
this unique capitalist development path. Abstract, theoretical
exploration and concrete empirical analysis are put together in
the hope that neo-Weberian concern for empirical richness and
neo-Marxist urge for theoretical clarity can be reconciled. And
in light of the revealed tension between structures' and
1 functions' in different stages, the hidden dynamic of urban
politics in Hong Kong is hoped to be unveiled.
The last chapter has been contributed to an overview of
how political development in Hong Kong has been related to the
changing social environment in the past decades and to examine
how the emergence of a new political arrangement help in various
ways to solve the problems and crises facing Hong Kong. By way
of situating the analysis of an urban issue in the historical
context, wider problems of the nature of the state in Hong Kong
would thus be highlighted.
The epilogue supplemented is a review and critique of
some of the works on Hong Kong housing issues in which the
problem of future research is discussed.
CHAPTER 2: POLICY ANALYSIS STATE THEORIES
Broadly speaking, contemporary political analysis of
state activities and their relations to society can be classified
as belonging to three main branches, namely, pluralist,
managerialist and class approach. .As Alford and Friedland (1985)
argues, each theoretical perspective is characterized not only by
having its own distinct theory, paradigm or a set of hypotheses,
but is usually all three at the same time. Therefore, we would
notice that there is always in each perspective a particular
combination of institutional logic of social totality emphasized,
a distinct insistence upon making analysis on a selected social
dimension, as well as certain aspect of complex social structure
which has been thought to be able to exert primary causal effect.
Pluralism
The most important institutional logic in pluralist
analysis (see Dahl,1956;Deutsch,1963) is the process of
individual participation. They emphasize to analyze how various
institutional arrangements have achieved political modernization
and facilitate peaceful, evolutionary societal change. Apart
from focusing upon the legal and constitutional aspects which
have already been expressed in existing bourgeois society, its
analysis is also based upon an individualistic standpoint.
Thereby, individual legal and formal rights which guarantee the
equal participation of citizens is read as the ultimate
foundation of political consensus and legitimacy. Elections,
public opinions, and interest group activities are also taken as
the reflections of the preferences of the society at large.
Therefore, pluralist perspective has a neutralistic conception
about government, and a harmonious attitude towards society.
Their emphasis upon cultural dimension is also reflected in their
integrationist viewpoint.
In the wake of the recent concern about the problems
facing western political systems, as succintly captured by the
notion of 'crisis of democracy (Huntington, 1975), the underlying
constitutionalism of pluralistic analysis has been placed under
severe critique, which comes both from the conservative and the
radical camps. This normative approach to the studies of the
constitutional arrangements has already gradually given way to a
more positive and realistic analysis of the 'decision-making
process (policy science) and more fundamental critiques from the
Marxist approach (class perspective). Although assumptions and
focus of criticisms from left and right are very different, they
both share the belief that the pluralistic perspective have
erroneously failed to see how modern bureaucracy is operating
under ultimate societal constraints. As a result, pluralist
analysis can get us no further than to repeat the assumed
individual legal rights, which have verbally been described in
the given constitution, thereby, providing description instead of
explanation for the understanding of policy formation in the
capitalist state.
Manager ial i sm
Both as a reply and a critique to pluralism, a new
managerialist perspective1 has developed (see Tilly, 1975;Bell,
1973,Skocpol,1979). Managerialist perspective singles out the
relations of political power as the most important aspect in
contemporary society. The institutional logic this perspective
is much concerned with is the actual operation of the bureaucracy
rather than participation processes which is lying up and above
the administrative machine. Although they may not abandon the
consensus-building view and the neo-evolutionism in toto as
are cherished by the pluralist in accounting for the development
of political system, they point to the fact that policy-making is
not completed in a vacuum devoid of power conflicts and political
control.
In contrast with the individualistic emphasis,
managerialist believes that policies are the outcomes of the
political processes which are largely conducted on the
organizational level which lies beyond individuals' control.
Individualistic assumption of equal right is unrealistic,
instead, elite domination and bureaucratic complexity of
decision-making are two aspects which we should place our
attention upon.
Managerialism is not a coherent whole, for there has
been different emphases among the advocates. Some would take
Weberian rationalization of bureaucracy and the rise of
purposive—rational action of the state as their main diagnosis cl
contemporary society (see Bell,1973), others (see Mills,1956)
would refer the stated rationalityirrationality as the results
of political struggles between elites and the mass. To the
former, policy-making are processes which are subjected to
constant internal self-correcting movements. To the later, state
policies are either simply reflections of elite preferences, or
the inherent characteristic of bureaucratic organization. To
them, power domination is the exercise of what has been
routinized rather than the acts of particular will.
Both versions of managerialism agree with each other on
the fact that the major problems facing contemporary capitalism
are the dominance of an ever bulky bureaucracy, as well as the
endless intrusion of the state activities into the private life.
An optimist would see that an efficient, and effective rational
policy machine can thus be instated as a self-correcting movement
of bureaucracy (Galbraith, 1972;Bell, 1973), an pessimist would see
that this technicism is unsound. For not only is the rather
naive notion about a perfect policy machine' is relegated
(Mills,1956;Gouldner,1970) to be Utopian, the contemporary
political problem is not merely an technical problem indeed.
Internal and external critique of managerialism has
raised the question about a more fundamental aspect of political
study. The neutral premise cherished by the managerialist that
the state can enjoy complete autonomy when it comes to interact
with the society and economy is further attacked by the Marxists
as feeble indeed. To Marxists, although managerialism is aware
of the conflictual nature of policy formation of the state, it is
criticized for halting the critique of unequal power relations
just where it should begin. For if the state is no longer seen
as neutral and what the analysis concerned is not only with the
procedural aspects, power relations that underlie the state
structure should thus be exposed. Thereby, the ultimate contra¬
dictions of the society in which the state is embedded should
further be revealed. Otherwise, the explanations offered by the
managerial is t are at best misleading, if not biased, since
problems are lying not so much in the state as an institution but
in the society at large.
Also, since confrontations between the state and the
society in terms of resources, demands, values and objectives are
so great, the managerialist policy prescriptions, which are
largely based only upon technical and organizational reforms, is
indeed unrealistic. For thorough understanding which can benefit
human praxis would only be possible if one can get beyond the
limited conception of state as merely an institution in the
society per se. Instead, a more comprehensive grasp of the
interactive dynamic among economy, society, and the state is
needed, and all the class relations, economic structure and
ideological factors have to be taken into account. Since
rationalization of administration is but an epiphenomenal
manifestation of the process of accumulation which is more
fundamental to the operation of capitalist society at large.
Class Perspective
The relationship between state activities and the
society is taken as one of the main problems in Marxist analysis.
In that large spectrum of styles of analysis which can all be
classified as class perspective, different emphases and stages of
theoretical development can be found. What unites them is their
explanatory primacy given to the capital accumulation process and
its status as the central institutional logic in contemporary
capitalist society. What they usually provide as the explanation
of a particular policy is either the systemic requirement of the
capital accumulation process or the interest of the capitalist
class.
Also, as they all stress to put their analysis on
societal level rather than individual and organizational level,
they always challenge the believed demarcation line between the
state and the society, which exists only in legal or constitut¬
ional terms. As a result, they would rather specify their object
of analysis as 'the capitalist state', rather than using the more
neutral notions of 'government' or 'bureaucracy' as such.
Although they share these basic assumptions about
capitalism, they are largely divided among themselves on
explaining how the interest of capital accumulation can be
served, directly or indirectly, by the policy-making process of
the state. In face of the by and large 'democratically' elected
governments in major advanced capitalist countries, which have
universal suffrage as the organizational principle, they are
constantly bearing the burden of proof to show how the logic of
capital accumulation can ultimately dominate or bias the
seemingly neutral decision-making machine.
Instrumentalism
One strand of arguments from class perspective would
answer the above question by stating that the state is actually a
mere instrument of the dominant capitalist class (see Miliband,
1969). The capitalist class, by holding its dominant economic
power can in effect control more or less equivalent political
power and put the state under its heel. The mechanisms by which
the capitalist class can sustain its dominance are the inherently
biased election systems which favour candidates backed by big
businesses or their associates. This instrumentalist view are
also trying to prove that it is the interests and demands of the
capitalists that the state administration are responding to.
However, not only has the complexity about the election
results in many advanced capitalist countries caused serious
problems for the instrumentalist explanation, its ambiguous
conception about the 'interest for capital accumulation'
also leads to many difficulties. The problem is most serious in
accounting for the rise of welfare state which usually contains
benefits which is to the interest of the working class. They are
usually caught in the muddle of distinguishing 'a trade-off
between short-term concession arid long-term dominance' from a
'real retreat of the capitalist class'. mereiore, this
empirically inspired tradition of Marxist analysis has now lost
much of its persuasion they once have, new approaches have come
in place for the analysis of the capitalist state.
Structuralism
While the theoretical weakness of instrumentalism has
been largely due to its deterministic attitude towards the
empirical reality, structuralism is another major current of the
class perspective which is adopted by the Marxists to solve the
thorny problem of Relative autonomy of the state (see Althusser,
1970). And by way of shifting their analysis to a rather abstract
plane, structuralists try to reconcile the apparent tension
between theoretical necessity and empirical divergence in
abstract and rationalistic terms.
As far as state policy is concerned, structural
analysis (Poulantzas, 1973;Castells, 1977) leaves a broader space
for those policies which has been instated apparently to the
interest of the working class. Since individual capitalist's
interest to maximize the rate of exploitation inay not always be
coincided with long term capitalist interest to have stable
condition of accumulation, a 'neutral third force' is needed to
arbitrate between. Also, conflicts among different capitalists
which can only be reconciled through rational planning
necessitate an autonomous institution to stand above the
accumulation process, acting as an 'ideal collective capitalists'
itself.
To the structuralists, the real class interest of
capital can only be realized as the continued existence of a
stable structure which can guarantee the dominance of the class
relationship in all the political, economic and ideological
spheres. The power of determination by the economic sphere
(capital accumulation) acts in the overall reproduction of the
relations of production by means of the exercise of hegemony
through ideological subordination (ISA), and the maintenance of
bourgeois order and law (RSA) (Althusser,1969,1970).
Early Poulantzas (1973) has extended the structural
analysis juridical-political relations which have been inscribed
into the basic social relations of capitalist society and
discussed the resulted isolation effects' upon the limits and
manners in which political class struggles takes place. In his
approach, class domination is virtually secured before any class
struggle happens, since under the individualistic, hence
divisive, ideological as well as legal-political relations, class
relations are always masked and class confrontation can at the
end be consciously or unconsciously evaded. Thus, hegemonic
faction of the capitalist classes in charge of the state can
enjoy comfortably the dominance since it is protected by the very
autonomy of the state. As a result, it is possible to have a
state policy that seems to profit certain dominated classes
(sometimes even cut into the dominant classes' economic power),
but it can never be seen as a retreat of the dominant power of
the dominant class. To Poulantzas, not only individual right to
participate constantly acts as the basis of integration and
legitimation, as the pluralist believes, it paradoxically
facilitates the basis of power domination in capitalist society
as well.
While structuralism has the merits of explaining the
dominance of bourgeoisie in terms of the objective, holistic
social formation rather than direct control, it is charged as a
kind of 'structural determinism' or 'structural super-determinism'
(Hindess Hirst, 1977). For if the forces of determination are
always lying totally outside the plane of concrete reality, it is
hardly conceivable how active class struggles or emancipatory
political project can influence the course of historical
development in seeking alternative to the capitalistic path.
Moreover, a perspective devoid of any discussion of the active
aspect of the historical agents can easily slip into a kind of
teleological functionalism and the analysis would become empty
and tautological in return. Because of that weakness, a more
empirically-oriented strand of class perspective of the state has
arised later as a response.
Class-Struggle School
To someone who are not familiar with Marxist social
science, it would seem rather striking that the debate among
Marxists on the problem of the state runs almost parallel to that
between Parsonian structural-functionalism and its critics in
traditional American sociology. And it is the school of class-
struggle who takes the similar stand of the anti-functionalist
critics by emphasizing the agency aspect in social analysis,
upholding the conscious and willful class struggle as the most
determining factors in influencing the activities of the state
(see Thompson,1963,1978).
While this trend of analysis is divergent in the
question of whether class should be taken as the sole significant
force or whether a proper causal status should be given to other
non-class powers, particularly in face of the recently rising
non-class social movements, it has distinguished themselves as an
viable alternative class approach. They claim that the state and
its policies cannot be understood other than as indeterminate
results of concrete 'balance of forces'. Any apriori judgment
such as exhibited in structuralism can only be fatalistic in
politics and hollow in theoretical terms.
In an attempt to avoid the economism in instrumentalist
analysis, and the 'sophisticated economism, in structuralist
approach, the class-struggle school has opened a new way of
'politicism in understanding the relation between the state and
the society. While they are successful in resisting the over-
obssession with theory in structuralism, their weakness also lies
in their empirical methodology which invites almost endless
determinants into the explanation of historical specificity. As
a result, it comes up at the end in no way distinct from the
pluralism they have attacked in the first place. While they have
the alleged power to explain the large variety of realities, they
have somehow compromised the theoretical rigor Marxist analysis
once has promised, and become ambivalent upon the need to
comprehend contemporary capitalism as a complex structure in a
systematic approach.
The failing of this would mean a tremendous confusion
about levels of analysis and loss of grip of the relationship
between theoretical explanations and concrete events. And as far
as the problem of state policy-making is concerned, the cause of
this agnostic politicism' is the neglect of the fact that the
state in capitalism is not entirely an open field for political
struggles but an institutional arrangement which has its own
organizational dynamic, responding and reacting only selectively
toward the societal demands. The rather arbitrary account about
'the balance of forces' has missed out this fundamental aspect
discovered by the managerialist and thus inevitably fails to
understand the complicated roles of the state.
From the above exposition of the development of the
state theories, we know that the whole debate involves a number
of intertwining themes. Owing to the different orientations of
the three perspectives, it seems unlikely that a unified
perspective would be synthesized. The apparent obstacle lies in
the lack of a theory of politics that can argue through both the
individual, organizational, and societal levels, taking the
articulation of all the political, economic and cultural
dimensions, as well as the processes of accumulation, rationali¬
zation and participation aspects into account at the same time.
The following chapter would discuss the state theory
proposed by German sociologist, Claus Offe, since his unique way
to approach the question seems to be a promising breakthrough
which deserves more attention. And the analysis of Hong Kong
housing policy in the following chapters would be based on the
ideas he has proposed.
Notes:
1. Managerialist perspective is particularly influential
in British yrban studies (see Pahl, 1977;Rex Moore, 1967). For
detailed criticisms of managerialism in urban studies, one can
refer to works of Saunders (1986).
2. Althusser (1969,1970) introduces the concepts of
Structural dominance' and determined-in-the-last-instance1 to
rescue the notorious determinism in previous Marxist analysis.
He also extends the concept of the state into a wider sphere and
thus distinguishes the repressive state apparatus' (RSA) and
ideological state apparatus' (ISA) in an attempt to incorporate
the analysis of ideological domination into a wider structural
framework in explaining capitalist dominance.
CHAPTER 3: OFFE'S APPROACH
If Offes approach can be summarized in simple words,
it can be said that it is the concern about the dialectical
tension between structure and 'function that remains as the
essence of his approach. Vfriile 'structure refers to the
administrative-institutional arrangements of the state in
particular and the articulation of different social subsystems in
general, 'function refers to the ways and organizational
principles under which the society is reproduced. In the parti¬
cular context of capitalism, the question becomes how the
structure of a capitalist state comes into dialectical contra¬
diction with its functions, namely, in the maintenance of the
capitalist accumulation process.
In this chapter, Offes sociological theory of the
capitalist state will be introduced briefly in relation with
his whole sociological thinking, such as his reliance on system
theory and his own crisis theory of capitalism.
System theory
Although it is widely considered that Offe is a Marxist
sociologist, his thought actually is drawn from a broader
intellectual background. Throughout the last two decades, he has
been engaged in debates and dialogues with writers of different
persuasions. His state theory comes from his debate with the
then popular 'state derivation approach represented by Hirsch
(1978). And the basis of his state theory is a social theory
which is drawn by a large part from the system theory developed
by Luhmann (1982).
As Luhmann's social system theory is originated from
Durkheim and Parsons, representing a dominant trend in German
sociology of a revival of new-Parsonianism, Offe's basic
problematic is more Durkheimian than Marxist. Therefore, rather
than following the 'derivationists' in locating the rationale and
dynamic of the development of the capitalist state in the
intrinsic tendency of the development of capitalism, as
prescribed by Marx in his work Das Kapital, he asks a more
basic sociological question: How a given historical society
reproduce itself while maintaining or altering its identity? In
other words, his main concern is both to identify the structures
and mechanisms which engender the societal continuity and
identity, and to analyze the reasons which bring about breaches
in that social continuity.
Offe has borrowed directly from Luhmann in treating
society as that composed of three basic subsystems, namely,
economic, political-administrative and normative-legitimation
systems.
In Offe's view, cohesion of society and historical
continuity is problematic, rather than self-evident. And this
question also highlights at the meantime the role of the state,
particularly the functions of repressive, regulative, ideological
and other state apparatus in overcoming the problem of social
integration. -As we shall later see, this classificatory schema
plays an important, part in his crisis theory.
Theory of Capitalism
As it comes to the specific analysis of capitalist
society, the problem would become as how state policy can maintain
the cohesion and functioning of the society which is characterized
by private utilization of capital and free wage-labour. Therefore,
the primary function the capitalist state has to fulfill is to
guarantee the exchange relationship to be the dominant principle
of social structure.
In the diagnosis of the problems facing capitalism,
he follows Marx's approach, seeing that the basic contradiction
in any capitalist society is the dialectical relation between
use-value and exchange-value. Capitalist path of development
means that the principles of competitive commodity exchange is
trying all its way to be the dominant organizational principle of
the economic system. But as the experience of the recent
development of most of the advanced capitalist countries shows,
the economic system is composed of more than one sector. And in
the sector such as the state sector, monopoly sector and the
'residue sector', i.e. the dependent population such as old aged
and student, competitive commodity exchange is far from the
dominant organizational principle. Therefore, those sectors are
constantly undermining the absolute dominance of the commodity
principle and laying the ground for the 'system crisis' discussed
below.
Also, he further points out that a basic obstacle to
the expansion of capitalism is the transformation of non-wage
labours into wage labours since it is a process which cannot be
guaranteed solely by the exchange relations. Because the
reproduction of labour power is not a process totally governed by
the law of value, their appearance in terms of quantities, time
and place is not dependent on strategic choices which are based
on criterion of salability, the state has to find a way to
balance the disproportionate supply and demand. And Offe argues
that it is exactly these requisites which give rise to the origin
of social policy in contemporary welfare state (Offe, 1984c).
Crisis theory
The intervention by the political-administrative
subsystem in the economic subsystem has a basic problem in
politicising the production process, i.e. it creates problems in
maintaining the 'internal disjunction' among subsystems. As Offe
(1984a,p53) puts it:
The problem facing the political-administrative
system is not merely that of maintaining a
specifically 'positive balance' between essential
regulatory services and fiscal inputs or between
mass loyalty and welfare state or repressive
policies. It also consists in dealing wTith these
two problem complexes (the avoidance of economic
malfunctions and political conflicts) in such a
way that one type of problem is not solved by
aggravating the other. (my emphasis)
In other words, 'internal disjunction' is a relative insulation
of problems from spilling over from one subsystem to another.
Offe argues that capitalism can acquire true stability,
i.e. get rid of any crisis, only when all the political-administ¬
rative and normative relations are subordinated to the exchange
relations. Therefore he says that it is very difficult to keep
the tension between the different organization principles in
different subsystems from assuming a crisis proportion, and there
exists only a narrow path of development by which the 'system
compatibility' can be maintained and the dilemma of determining
the 'necessary' and 'dangerous' levels of intervention can be
solved.
Offe also emphasizes the need of maintaining the
normative conditions for the process of commodification of labour
power. And in order to do so, the normative subsystem have to be
either positively or negatively subordinated to the exchange
subsystem. That is to say, if it cannot positively contribute
to, and create the preconditions for the functioning of the
dominant organizational principle and the sphere of economy, they
have to be limited by, and insulated from this economic system.
Otherwise, 'system crisis' would occur in which the exchange
principle will be restricted and questioned by the other two
organizational principles, and thus jeopardizing the hegemonic
position of the exchange principle (Offe,1984c).
Nevertheless, modern capitalism necessitates the state
to take up the role to maximize the exchange opportunities
between capital and labour and the political regulation in the
private spheres, such as those in the 'statization' tendency of
the socialization, education and other processes providing
cultural motivation is necessary. Therefore, the subordination
to commodity principle without politicization is inconceivable
indeed. Thereby, extra-economic norms and appeals would thus
feedback into the political and economic subsystems. Problems of
'internal disjunction' would once be aggravated in the long run.
State theory
The inevitable repoliticization of the relation of
production, as illustrated in the case of labour power, points to
the growth of 'system autonomy' of the political-administrative
subsystem. If this trend exceeds a certain limits, the
subordination which is vital to the stability of the capitalist
system would be undermined. According to Offe (1975), the
autonomy of the capitalist state lies firmly within four limiting
criteria (Offe,1973):
1. Exclusion
The state has no authority to order or control
production. Accumulation takes place in private accumulation
units (some countries even prohibits any state intervention in
the concrete use of production). In system language, it is to
say that there must and should be a well-demarcated boundary
between the political and the economic.
2. Maintenance
It is a mandate of the state to sustain create
condition of accumulation, keeping the accumulation process from
the threats that may either come from the working class or non-
capitalist interests, or from destructive competition of
individual accumulation units, of particular industry or region,
or any that may threat the capital as a whole.
3. Dependency
The power relationships of the state depends upon the
presence and continuity of the accumulation process in terms of
its extensive reliance on resources created in the accumulation
process. This fundamental dependency upon accumulation acts as a
selective principle upon state policies.
4. Legitimation
The state has to convey the image of being an organizat¬
ion of powTer that pursues common and general interests of society
as a whole, allows equal access to power and is responsive to
justified demands. That means the existence of a capitalist
state presupposes the Systematic denial of its nature els a
capitalist state.
These four criteria delimit the principal structure and
function, from which the fundamental contradictions of the
contemporary capitalist state can thus be traced.
Modes of State Operation
Offe further distinguishes between two different modes
of state intervention which have arised as responses to the
changing pattern of the accumulation process:
a Allocation: it is a mode of activity that aims at
creating and maintaining the conditions of accumulation in a
purely authoritative apparatus, such as bureaucracy described by
Weber, in which the authority is based on constitution, legal
norms or political majority. What guide the state activities in
these cases are rules and politics. Once the political demands
are set, the processes to satisfy the well defined and recognized
demands are straight forward. State operation is then insulated
from other non-administrative concern.
As it has been noticed that the Weberian mode of
bureaucratic operation is always rigid and inflexible, it suits
only those matters which needs no creativity or complex
conjunctural discretions, because what essential here is the
unmistaken accomplishment of the given goals and tasks. One
crucial criterion of the suitability of this mode, els defined by
Offe, is that the resources involved is what already in the hand
of the state. But in the action dealing with resources that have
not already been in the hand of the state, such els land, taxes
and repressive forces, different method of operation rather than
rules and different strategy of policy-making other than formal
politics is needed.
b Production: In contrast to allocation, production
activities of the state emerge out of the failure of the private
production processes to provide particular physical inputs that
are not considered profitable from the point of view of any
accumulating units. They may be physical inputs that are too
costly, too risky on demand or those incur externalities.
The characteristic of productive state activities is
that the state has to generate what is not already at the
disposal of the state. In this sense, the state is no longer a
passive problem solver, but to organize certain activities
directed toward the environment and to adopt for itself a certain
organizational procedure from which the production and
implementation of policies emerge. The state deals with problem
of its internal mode of operation at the same time when it deals
with a problem in its environment, to the extent that whenever a
formal strategy is adopted, it determine unexplicitly what
potential goals are and what problems have the chance to come up
on the political agenda.
Following this, input-oriented model of bureaucracy is
not a suitable structure for productive mode of the state
operation, since adequacy of the state activities is no longer
only judged by whether it has conformed to the established rules, or
whether a set of constitutionally defined goals has been
actualized, but also whether it can lead to certain general
results.
Since the procedures cannot be set by standardized,
routinized rigid hierarchies. Goal definitions and the ways to
accomplish those goals would all be problematic issues. And if a
rigid bureaucratic structure will not work, according to Offe,
productive activities should either be guided by the purposive-
rational model or that based on democratic conflict-and-
consensus, which is not confined to the party system. Since in
this case, cooperation or acquiescence is needed not only in
election, but in the daily operation of the state.
A purposive-rational model can reach its ideal mode in
an individual accumulating unit. But the state organization
differs from a capitalistic firm in several crucial aspects;
firstly) while a firm can have the choice of ends determined, by
market forces, the state cannot automatically have operational
goals which are not in themselves contradictory with each others
in one way or another; secondly, even at some time the state has
arrived at some goals, the state as an organization cannot be
purposive-rational to the extent that it can ignore the side-
effects of the production process as far as any 'means' is i
employed only instrumen tally for the ends' themselves. Also,
the stability of environmental conditions is less likely to be
guaranteed owing to the difficulties arised from scale and size
of production. More importantly, a common denominator for means
and ends is very difficult to find, particularly when reforms of
state production cannot usually be calculated in monetary terms.
Given that purposive-rationality is not a panacea for
the problems, the state has to eventually take up a more active
role in consensus-building. The state has to be involved in
directly mobilizing support from the public for any innovative
policy to be implemented. But as Offe argues, the shifting away
from its original passive gesture of bureaucratic decision-making
towards an active intervention would negate the basic distinction
between the state and the society. Mobilization of mass support
would in turn invite more demands and interests to articulate
themselves than that can be satisfied. The failure to do so
means that the crisis emerging from the internal propelling force
of accumulation would spill over to the normative system. An
economic crisis would be transformed into political and normative
crisis in return.
Ungovernability crisis
In discussing the problem of ungovernability problem
of the contemporary capitalist state, Offe agrees with the
conservative writers in the description of crisis as the gaps
between the ever rising demands and the decreasing steering
capacity of the state. But he is doubtful about the hope
conceived by the conservatives that this problem of overburdening
can be successfully tackled solely by the change of institutional
arrangements, since any change of them would create and reproduce
the problems at another levels or in another manners. The con¬
tradiction lies not so much in an increase of irresponsible
demands or mismanagement of the state bureaucrats but in the
unresolvable tension between the Structure and function of
the state, as prescribed in the four defining criteria of the
capitalist state discussed above.
As to the means by which capitalism can get out of
crisis, the options for the state are limited. To reduce the
ever inflated claims, the state either has to revert to the
market mechanism and reprivatization, or to use social scientific
criteria to act as 'filter mechanisms in registering pertinent
demand. But market principle and expert-filtering is in essence
either answering back or evading from the fundamental problem,
therefore, the state has to constantly rely on undertaking
administrative-rational reforms or to extend the liberal corpora-
tist strategy to enhance the process of consensus-building. It
can only turn to normative appeals by upholding symbols such as
nationalism, or other sense of belonging and identity, to
increase the steering capacity which is already at stake.
Therefore, administrative reforms are bound to be
limited in their effectiveness, and the only hope for the
capitalist state seems to be the occasional appeal to norms and
good-will of the people to cooperate and the contingent give-and-
takes in the co-optation and corporatist arrangements to secure
consensus and support.
Crisis and Legitimation
Since the governance of the capitalist state has to
depend on the support of the political and normativemotivation
subsystem, any objective crisis' emerged from the economic sub¬
system would then spill over to the later two. The politiciza-
tion of the economic and normative subsystems will eventually
exhibit as a 'subjective crisis', as the source of mass support
is exhausted and the subordination of normative motivation has
failed. Motivation crisis will then in turn elicit more
political demands and calls for more participation. In this way,
economic crisis, political crisis and cultural crisis will
wllv- hand in hand.
What paradoxical to the capitalist system is, the very
exchange principle which is central to capitalist accumulation is
constantly, by promoting the culture of commodity, eroding the
basis of mass loyalty and the opportunities to establish
idealistic consensual unity, which the state can exploit. As a
result, a permanent crisis of legitimacy is deemed inevitable
in the development of capitalism. It is part of a syndrome
dominating in the politics of the capitalist state.
Offe, thereby, unites the discussion in all dimensions
of the society, linking all the institution, accumulation, and
participation aspects of the contemporary capitalist state into a
coherent framework. His political analysis of the problems
facing the state also highlights the essential role played by the
state and the underlying significance of the ongoing administrative
and political reforms in all fronts.
As Offe s approach focuses mainly on the inherent
dilemma of the contemporary capitalist state, it seldom directly
discusses the problems of non-capitalist ones. But the essence
of his approach, namely, the fundamental contradiction between
state structure and state function can be extended in explaining
wider phenomena. Therefore, in the following chapters in which
Hong Kong housing policies would be analyzed, different stages of
political development of the state will be identified.
As the following analysis shows, the state's behaviours
of Hong Kong before mid-'60s cannot be comprehended as that of a
fully-fledged capitalist state. It, nevertheless, was in a tran-
sitional period, when colonial state structure was retained,
transforming towards a more mature capitalist development in the
'70s. And then, the behaviours of the state both before and
after mid-'60s will be further contrasted with each other, and
the tension between state structures and the functions for capita¬
list development will be discussed.
Notes:
1. Offe also points to another important reason for the
increase of state production activities which are not due to the
nature of product or monopoly, but are derived from the needs of
competition itself. He argues that competition between
accumulating units themselves can lead inevitably to a trend that
the mechanisms by which the accumulating units can defense
against competitive pressure would be exhausted. Competition
will then shifts from the competition of innovating new defensive
strategies to that of innovating new dimension of competition
itself (e.g. from price competition to product design competition
to market competition). This shifts the focus of competition to
a meta-level and, eventually, accumulation can only be sustained
by resources that cannot be supplied by the accumulation process x
itself, and thus productive state activities are needed (see
Offe, 1973). One should note that his explanation for state
intervention is different from the state monopoly capitalism
theory (Baran and Sweezy, 1966;Fine and Harris, 1979).
CHAPTER 4: HOUSING POLICIES IN THE PERIOD OF
THE COLONIAL STATE
Anyone who wants to understand the behavior of the
capitalist state of Hong Kong has to first recognize the basic
fact that Hong Kong has been and still remains until 1997 as a
dependent colonial polity which has its ultimate political
allegiance to the Crown of Britain.
One common way to explain the relation between the state
and the society is to attribute the state policies as the
reflections of the British colonial interests and from these the
orientation, motive and rationale of various state policies are
derived. This view has been conceived by quite a number of
people in Hong Kong, especially among the radical critics, over
the past years. While it remains as a understandable phenomenon
for being a popular belief among the people who are by and large
excluded from the policy-making processes under the colonial
political structure, it is nevertheless unable to give more
insight upon the state actions other than generating suspicions
offered by usually ungrounded 'conspiracy theory1.
It is not to say that the conspiracist criticisms must
be wrong in its content by being suspicious, but that one would
lose sight of the more fundamental societal constraints on state
actions if one is too much submerged in speculating the under¬
lying motive of the state. Put in other words, the political
argument is not wrong by itself, but the a priori presupposition
of state's motives is not always fruitful.
Another common type of explanation is to attribute the
state policy-making as a neutral bureaucratic process which only
calculates and acts out the common interest of the society at
large. While this explanation suffers from the weakness of the
managerialist perspective discussed in the second chapter, it
further misleads people not to recognize some important
characteristics possessed by the Hong Kong bureaucracy, i.e. the
state system as a branch apparatus of a colonial structure.
Thus, in this thesis, I will try to explicate the
complicated interconnections between colonial structure,
capitalist economy and wider social and political development in
different stages, as they are manifested in the development of
housing policies. It is argued that the basic characteristic of
the state before and after later '60s was quite different.
Therefore, I will classify them as belonging to two separate
periods, namely, the colonial state period and capitalist state
period. The discussion of this chapter will concentrate on the




Chapter 5 will discuss the changes in '70s and '80s
respectively.
A. 1945- 1954
After the Japanese occupation and Chinese civil war, a
large number of immigrants had come to take refuge in Hong Kong.
This sudden upsurge of population, though was not unprecedented,
posed as a major social problem. Apart from causing severe
congestion in the limited private building in the urban area,
huge volume of population took squatting as the means to shelter
themselves.
It is generally believed that the housing shortage at
that time was inevitable and the subsequent intervention by the
state in providing public housing was indispensable (Pryor, 1978).
But recent study by Alan Smart (1986) on the housing situation
during the period 1945-1953 shows, the picture was far more
complicated than that.
Smart argues that after the reoccupation of the British
in 1945, population gradually rose from 600,000 to almost a
million at the end of 1946. Admittedly, the problem of housing
shortage emerged was serious, but not yet beyond control. The
subsequent seeming failure' of the private sector to provide
enough housing for the rising population was actually due more to
the numerous obstacles brought about by the state rather than the
'innate incapacity of property builders at that time.
In 1947, debate in the Legislative Council showed an
almost unprecedented confrontation between the state authority
and the business interests represented by the Legislative Council
unofficial members. Business interest complained about the
unrealistic degree of control over property-building through
Crown Lease conditions, the excessive cost level of building
material because of the over-restrictive building regulations,
delays in approving building schemes as well as high land prices.
Developers felt bitter and frustrated, because under the Crown
monopoly of landownership and rigid Building Ordinances, no new
development or redevelopment could occur without extensive
consultation with the government.
In 1948, there were only 2 per cent of the population
(30,000) living in squatters. But in 1953, the proportion rose
to 10 per cent (300,000). Most of the expanded population were
absorbed by intensification of use in the present buildings or a
certain degree of rebuilding rather than by new developments. A
report of the then Special Committee for Housing admitted that an
important factor in the housing shortage was the amount of land
being made available was not enough. High land prices also led
to unnecessary destruction of existing property for redevelop¬
ment. As a result of these restrictions and the accompanied rent
controls, the private sector was not given enough incentive to
build new houses and appeared to be unsuccessful in accommodating
the rapidly expanding population.
The tendency to increase further the state control in
land use and housing, despite the widely criticized bureaucratic
inertia, was actually taking shape well before the war and was
evident in the 'Report of the Housing Commission' (1935) which
had already proposed to provide housing by the state directly for
the working classes. Although the report could not result in
positive state action at that time owing to the state's
reluctance to commit financially, it showed the general attitude
of the colonial state regarding to housing and land was more
interventionist than people usually conceived. But this kind of
interventionism in the subsequent special situation resulted more
in 'state control' rather than 'state nrovision'.
Bristow (1984) has also documented the plan of the post
war government to introduce more planning control. In 1946, the
Governor requested to London for a development planner to advise
on planning and development. The act has been seen by Bristow as
to counter the vested interests in Hong Kong;- This led to the
appointment of Sir Patrick Abercrombie. His report was completed
by September 1948, including some long term and short term
policies. Yet. the process of building a town planning system
proceeded very slowly. The Town Planning Board under the
1939 Ordinance had been reinstated in 1947 but did not meet until
March 1951.
Although the subsequent response to this planning and
control exercises were more expedient than it hoped to be, the
whole process of property development in face of the ever rising
housing demand was halted by the bureaucratic consideration.
During these years, a lot of hostility in society was aroused due
to the state control on land administration which refused to
renew some of the 75-year Crown leases due at that time. This
had nothing to do with the planning delays but simply because the
state still upheld a directive issued by the Military
Administration in 1944, under which only short-term permit is
available.
On the whole, the situation in the post war era was
dominated by the state's concern to set up land administration.
This was due to the aim of the colonial state to have its control
of land and the idea to link up the newly established planning
and control system with British standard. But the administrative
chaos and lack of organization in the recently re-established
government in the post-war years just failed to deliver what the
people urgently wanted.
According to Smart (1986), from 1945 to 1958, no more
than 200 acres of Crown land were made available for housing in
the urban area and thus hindered the private development process
very much. Smart also puts forward his argument by an investi¬
gation of the 'illegal' property sector in Diamond Hill to show
that private investment in property development was actually
catering the needs for housing extensively, though it was out of
the state's recognition. Private purchases and sales of built
property mainly on land classified as for 'agricultural use only'
existed throughout the subsequent years. Sometimes the houses
were even built by concrete or were brick buildings of several
stories. This cannot be seen as the 'inability of the private
sector to cater for the need of the booming population. On the
contrary, Smart argues that the illegal' status of the building
was only the result of the stated insensitivity to the urgent
housing need of the people.
Although to prove further that there existed a totally
different alternative to the subsequent massive state intervention
in housing sector was difficult, and it is purely hypothetical to
suggest the private sector was able to take over the whole job,
it nevertheless points to the fact that the rise of state
intervention in housing sector was not something of a general and
inevitable trend but a historical process determined by a whole
series of structural and conjunctural factors, among which the
chosen strategy of the state itself played not a small part.
At first, it was a historical fact that Hong Kong had
faced a sudden problem of housing shortage in post war time,
urgent measures had been called for to alleviate the problem.
Yet the structural factor which hindered the problem being solved
by capitalistic market means that Hong Kong was under the rule of
a government which had different concerns, aims, and constraints.
Therefore, the state could not react swiftly towards the urgent
social needs as the community required.
The rationale behind the state policy in this period
has to be attributed more to the colonial state structure in an
exceptional period when the bureaucratic operation could not run
in its full potential. Also, we see that the policies were the
products of a bureaucracy which was autonomous in a double sense.
On the one hand, the state was autonomous from the society. It
could ignore the pressure either from the working people,
immigrants or even the capital. On the other hand, the state had
to be independent and autonomous financially from its mother
country. Therefore, the state had to hold a balance budget
policy on its own, thereby, it refused to commit itself in the
provision of housing at that chaotic time.
It is understandable if one further considers the fact
that the then political situation in Hong Kong was far from
stable. Newly established Chinese Communist government had never
openly stated that she would let the colonial status of Hong Kong
to stay long. Therefore, any large scale commitment to the,
colony is inadvisable from the British point of view. And also,
the Hong Kong government had every reason to believe that the
problem caused by the large scale immigration would be alleviated
by itself since the immigrants would, els in the past, go bsLck
to China in a future not too long. Therefore, a tight fiscal
balance as the sole objective of the British administration here
was well entrenched els the guiding principle of the colonial
state. And we would see that throughout the following two
decades, Hong Kong government had held fast to this balance
budgetary policy as a way to distance itself from large scale
onmrnitmpnt in Hong Kong.
But we should also see that the 'autonomy' enjoyed by
the state did not rule out the fact that it had to be dependent
upon and constrained by the British in technical matter. There¬
fore in a time when housing problems were most pressing, reaction
of the state was constrained by the attempt to set up a well-
organized' system of town planning administration which was
technically adhered to Britain, rather than to respond to the
urgent needs of the local people. The failure of doing so caused
an expedient measure to intervene in the following decade.
B. 1954- 1963
Housing policies of the Hong Kong government after 1954
were given prominence by the start of state intervention in the
provision of housing. The change of state action was largely due
to a sudden fire outbreak in the Shek Kip Mei squatter camp.
More than 50,000 people were homeless and took refuge mainly on
the street. Drastic action was taken to alleviate the plight of
the fire victims and this led to a reversal of the original state
policy of not intervening in housing provision which involves
public expenses. High density multi-storey resettlement estates
which have been well-known as the Mark I II blocks, were built
to house the ex-squatters.
Resettlement Policy
Initially, the resettlement programme was initiated as
an emergency programme. But it was still not for humanitarian
reasons. On the contrary, the prime motive was an economic
consideration since immediate relief demands had been a heavy
financial burden to the state. It was estimated by the govern¬
ment that the amount spent every fortnight on direct relief could
build a six storey resettlement block. (Commissioner for
Resettlement,1955).
The programme later developed into a comprehensive
policy to serve the need of the state to secure the proper
provision of developable land. Hong Kong government at that time
made no secret of her motive in the provision of resettlement
housing as a means to ensure developable land to be available for
development purpose. The Commissioner for Resettlement (1955)
plainly admitted that
squatters are not resettled simply because they
need... or deserve, hygienic and fireproof homes;
they are resettled because the community can no
longer, afford to carry the fire risk, health
risk, and threat to public order and prestige
which the squatter areas represent and because the
community needs the land of which they are in
illegal occupation. And the land is needed
quickly.
Not only did he consider the squatters a very serious blot on
the colony's prestige, he also thought that it was
ridiculous for the economic and social progress
of the colony to be strangled by this land
shortage which could be relieved if illegal
structures could only be removed.
The hostility of the colonial state towards squatter
was not very surprising since it is common -for state bureaucrats
to judge from a western viewpoint. Indeed, this Eurocentric view
upon squatter was prevalent among many Third World countries
until recently. (Turner, 1967;Burgess, 1977). Yet the Hong Kong
state's hostility towards squatter was reinforced by the fact
that it was the Crown land which was occupied. The resultant
obstacle for the state to exercise her 1sovereign' power to
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control the land, which had been ceded to the Crown, was intoler-
able indeed. Therefore, the adverse attitude towards squatter
was further aggravated by the fear that any provision of public
services would be seen as a recognition of the de facto title to
land of the squatters.
In analyzing the squatter problem of Hong Kong, one has
to consider the difference between Hong Kong and most Third World
cities, where it is always the private landowner's right to their
land that has been encroached upon by squatters. On the
contrary, occupation of Crown land has been directly posed as an
serious obstacle to the revenue, in terms of land sale, of the
colonial state. Drakakis-Smith (1979,p56) shows that over 27 per
cent of the squatter areas cleared between 1956 to 1964 were used
for industrial development or auction sales, with only 42 per
cent being set aside for the construction of public housing
estates. Hopkins (1971,p294) concludes that in the period of
1958-1963, all the squatters displaced had been rehoused on land
equivalent to only 38 per cent of the area they previously
occupied. The figure remained more or less the same throughout
the period, and the lowest ratio of cleared land used in public
housing was scored in 1970 when less than one percent of the
previous year's clearance was used for any housing purposes
(Annual Report,1971).
Living conditions of the Poor
The resettlement policy which was directly geared
towards land management and squatter settlement did not cure the
housing problems. Worse still, residents of the early
resettlement housing were still living in appalling conditions.
People like Golger (1972) even doubts that whether the resettle¬
ment has actually improved the residents' living conditions, in
terms of health care facilities and basic amenities provided.
Also, this system which leaned only on the provision of a
mere living place ended up merely in providing excuses for the
state's refusal to provide the squatters with adequate public
services. Therefore, living conditions of both squatters and
resettlement tenants had not improved at the end.
During that period, although quite a number of squat¬
ters (50,000) has been rehoused, the squatter problem had not
been to any substantial extent alleviated. The problem was
partly attributed to the influx of immigrants and partly due to
the state's neglect of the bad and deteriorating conditions in
private tenements. Survey results show that a large number of
squatters were in fact ex-tenement dwellers rather than new
immigrants (Hopkins, 1971 ;Kehl, 1981). And this trend has been
shown to be carrying on for the next years.
The dilapidated pre-war building suffered further from
the lack of maintenance due to rent controls. Poor tenement
dwellers who could not afford to live in private new building had
no way to improve their situation. Therefore, some might just
take the choice to be squatter, hoping that one day they would
get resettled.
In private capitalist sector, property development was
facilitated by the relaxation of expensive legal procedures in
application for development. And the property sector enjoyed a
property boom after 1955. Yet the dearth of cheap land only
allowed redevelopment on the generally small size of available
site. High density developments thus resulted. The state
administration reacted to that by modifying the building
regulations in an effort to lower the population densities. But
in response to developers' lobby, a four year period of grace was
granted before the new measures became effective. And after
that, a frantic four years building boom resulted which was
characterized by low quality of building and poor environmental
and architectural impacts.
Despite a general increase of private tenement, rent
level remained high (Maunder, 1969). Rent control was not
effective since only the landlords were affected. Sub-letting
system in Hong Kong rendered the chief tenants to wipe off most
of the benefits by charging high rent on the sub-tenants.
For the poor, the remaining channels for getting
cheaper accommodation could only be found in other small scale
state subsidized schemes, such as Housing Authority and Housing
Society. Land was granted to both of them at a premium around
one-third of market price to produce houses for low income
families. But their progress was slow and could only house no
more than 161,000 tenants by 1964. Another state reaction worth
mentioning is a new Government Low Cost Housing (GLCH) programme,
yet the low level of commitment could only succeed in providing
housing for 25,000 by the year 1964. As a result, the situation
shown by 1961 Census was that 48 per cent of the population (i.e.
1.25 million people) were still living in substandard private
accommodation. (Table 4.1)
Reactive Housing Policies
On the whole, the colonial state in this period adopted
an reactive approach to the pressing housing problems. But while
maintaining its organizational principle as a minimally committed
colonial state, a resettlement policy which geared to industrial
development was going to take shape. Since the boom brought
about by the Korean War ended quickly, industrial growth led by
the Shanghais entrepreneurs started to emerge. Land resumption
for industrial and commercial use was gaining higher priority.
The articulation between housing and industry can be
analyzed from two perspectives: firstly, land is needed for
industrial development, therefore squatters occupying the
developable land had to be evacuated; secondly, industrial
production needed a secure and employable labour force. As far
as employability is concerned, poor squatters were actually a
large labour pool, therefore, resettlement estates were mostly
built in urban areas where the vicinity to factories was ensured.
Although the influx of immigrants brought an abundant
supply of labour power, labour discipline was a problem. In the
still turbulent years after the Chinese civil war, squatting was
largely an uncontrollable political headache for the colonial
state. Since pro-KMT elements were very active in the newly
immigrants who had just escaped from the communist rule in the
mainland, their conflicts with the left-wing communist sympathi¬
zers in Hong Kong was difficult to control. The problem came to
an explosive point in the 'Double-Ten Riot in 1956. The case
showed that the state had to maintain a delicate political
balance in that particular situation, since any grievances
experienced from everyday life of the people was prone to
be exploited politically. As far as squatting problem is
concerned, the state official plainly admitted that illegal
squatting was able to create risk of disorder (Commissioner for
Resettlement,1956).
From the analysis of housing policy at this period, we
understand more about the particular nature of autonomy of the
state in Hong Kong is not so much its being an independent
technocracy, as the managerialist may believe, but its assumption
of an uncommitted role in the society, meanwhile arbitrating the
conflicts between different political forces. Yet this type of
autonomy by uncommitment does not mean that the state has
stayed away from the accumulation process. On the contrary, as
Offe has pointed out, maintenance of the capital accumulation
process is one of the four prime functions of a capitalist state.
Although the polity of Hong Kong at this period was still caged
in a colonial structure, it had to respond to the demand of the
economic processes. But given the general policy framework of
uncoramitment, the available policy tools for the state to
facilitate growth was confined largely to provision and
management of land, as well as the control of labour to maintain
a stable environment for accumulation. We can actually see in
the subsequent development of housing policies that the above
consideration was the main underlying theme throughout.
C. 1964- 1972
After the first ten years of resettlement housing pro¬
gramme, Hong Kong had neither got rid of the problems of slum
dwellers or the illegal squatting1. Yet the situation was going
to be improved for several reasons: firstly, the introduction of
birth control brought about a slower population growth rate. In
1964, it fell below 30 per 1,000 for the first time after the
war; secondly, Hong Kong had in the last decade enjoyed the first
economic take-off, led by the export industrialization. The
former, with no doubt, had slowed down the growth of demand a
little, but the latter complicated the problem by the emergence
of a newly arised middle-income families' needs.
Private sector building industry lost momentum in the
ensuing years after a series of bank collapses which were much
brought about by the feverish building and speculation activities
elicited in 1962-64. At the second half of the '60s, slump of
property sector was further aggravated by the communist inspired
riot throughout the territory. As the scale of housing
production declined, rent and purchase prices continued to rise.
Evictions of poor families continued to occur which led to the
fall of the total share of population housed in the private
sector.
Planning and Public Housing Building
The major response of the state in this period was the
setting up of Housing Board in 1965 to review and monitor housing
situation and related policies Yet given the colonial state
structure which barred any democratic pressures, the actions
recommended by the Board were not effective. However, it was
still a historical event for it was the first time the many
agencies building public housing were brought within the purview
of a single body for planning purposes. And it virtually brought
the die-hard non-interventionism or the half-hearted resettlement
policy to an end.
At that time, the new planning body could only make
suggestions or propose projects to the state. It lacked
executive power to implement the plans. This severely hindered
it from getting beyond the purely passive advisory role. For
example, the fact that the Board could not manage to push through
the suggestion to extend the space allocation of resettlement
unit to 3.3m per adult, a standard long called for by the
public, was a severe set-back.
The small scale programme of public housing which aimed
at easing the housing problems of low income families was then
shouldered totally on the government GLCH scheme and the building
programmes of Housing Society. (Table 4.2) Yet again for the
reason of land availability, determined by the state policy to
preserve urban developable' land for other purposes, the new
housing estates were usually located in remote peripheral-
regions. The lack of transport facilities deterred many poor
families from opting for the choice offered. But the state only
responded by broadening the criteria of eligibility in order to
push up the programme. It led, as a result, to the widening up
of the scope of responsibility to house a wider range of population.
Policy of self-financing for the two agencies were also
implemented which brought a halt to extending loan facilities
after 1968. As a result, rent for these public housing had to be
raised, and only the projects which aimed at providing higher
quality of accommodation were to be taken into consideration.
This eventually brought about a divergent policy compared with
that aimed at low quality-low rent types of housing in resettle-
ment provision.
Slum, Squatter Resettlement
Apart from the building of public housing, the state
also set up another working party in 1964 to examine the problem
of slum clearance. It led also to the recognition of the
alternative of urban renewal as a solution to housing problem for
the first time. Yet the ambiguous terms of reference and the
lack of enthusiastic support for the job, the party only
arbitrarily singled out Western District as the Renewal District.
And also, because of the state did not want to commit itself in
forgoing any loss of revenue from sale of land cleared, it
refused to provide public housing estates in the cleared area as
a compensation. Residents were offered only a narrow choice to
opt for Government Low Cost Housing (GL£H) in peripheral regions
which were not welcomed by most working class families. Owing to
these difficulties, the renewal scheme could proceed very slowly
and resulted in little improvement for most of the tenement
dwellers.
On the question of squatter and resettlement, the most
innovative policy at this period was the publication of the White
Paper entitled 'Review of Policies for Squatter Control,
Resettlement and Government Low Cost Housing', in which a policy
of containment was adopted. All occupants of unlawful structures
were registered and considered eligible for government rehousing.
The existing structures were designated as 'tolerated' and no
extensions or new buildings would be permitted. Occupants of
non-tolerated structures would not get rehoused but be permitted
to move into 'licensed areas' where communal facilities were
available.
The White Paper also revised goals within the resettle¬
ment programme to include a number of different categories.
Compassionate cases and victims of disasters got the highest
priority, while squatters still had the next highest preference
on clearance. Indeed, not until 1970 were squatters to be
rehoused simply on the basis of poor living condition. This
showed that the resettlement policy as a 'compulsory clearance'
policy (Hopkins, 1971) had not changed.
Colonial State Housing Allocation
The overall housing policy of the colonial state in
this period was more a continuation of the original principle
than a genuine change of strategy. The effects of this
continuation brought the housing projects in sharp contrast with
those in Singapore where a more comprehensive housing policy was
geared to the real needs of the citizens. Also, the projects in
Singapore was launched in 1960s, shortly after independence,
while for twenty years after the war, the housing problems in
Hong Kong was still as poor as before.
With regard to the squatter policy, the basic principle
of the colonial state had not changed. As Drakakis-Smith (1979)
has pointed out, definition of tolerated dwelling did not change
the legal status of such structures. And the reason was that
the state had to retain juridical power to evict the occupants
of tolerated structure without compensation or offer of rehousing
a threat which could be employed to ensure that clearance
programmes went as scheduled. (Drakakis-Smith, 1979) Therefore,
this policy only recognizes a partial right of squatters to be
housed. Obviously, rehousing was not the right of the occupants
but only granted at the state's pleasure.
However, in the whole strategy of the state in dealing
with the housing problems, we would more or less notice a kind of
change being underway. The colonial bureaucratic state had moved
some significant steps in terms of its own rationality to adopt a
more positiveplanning approach. Yet the reform was confined to
a mode which did not allow the decision-making or the planning
process to be encroached in any notion of responsibility. There¬
fore, the reform of the state with regard to housing problem was
more a compromise between the old colonial structure with the
function to respond more positively to the needs brought about by
the societal growth and capital accumulation, rather than a re¬
orientation of the state.
This can further be understood from the analysis of the
nature of the state activities at that time. What the state of
Hong Kong had been involved in this period was still confined to
a type of allocative activities which operated mainly under
bureaucratic rationality, although the signs of the needs to have
more planning was appearing. And as housing and land were
defined as limited resources, demands for housing were defined as
largely a matter of consumption needs which could only be
satisfied within the scope of resources already in the hand of
the state. Since satisfaction of housing needs were defined-
merely as an allocative activities of the state, planning for
redistribution was limited in scope. But what still distin¬
guished the mode of operation of the state in Hong Kong at this
period from others in western countries was that even for this
type of allocative activities, the state bureaucracy was still
not guided by democratic politics, and the policies were the
results of arbitrary and reactive responses of the bureaucratic
state.
As noted by Weber, bureaucracy follows only the rules-
and norms enshrined in the constitution. Concrete steering and
policy making are controlled in the political party system which
provides the ultimate source of authority. Yet in the case of
Hong Kong, bureaucratic operation could not be seen purely in an
instrumental sense, since the mechanisms for recognition of needs
were not developed. Planning or rationalization of the state
immediately faced the question about the source of authority
which determines the criteria. This inevitably leads to the
problem of how to recognize pertinent and atisfiable' demands.
Chaos and confusion of the state housing policies in this period
showed exactly a transitional phenomenon whereby the state had
stuck to its original mode of colonial bureaucratic operation
while trying to find a way to rationalize its operation with
regard to the fulfillment of the functions as a capitalist state.
But as we would see in its subsequent development, this
embarrassing situation of the state, torn between a colonial
state model and a capitalist state model has changed. And the
uneasiness and inconsistency of the state organization and state
functions have been further manifested, whereby a new level of
problems and conflicts have arised in response.
Notes:
1• For those who have less suspicious view of the motive
of the state, it is also easy to see that the Hong Kong's state
has, compared with others in most Third World countries, an
enviable means, namely, the tnationalized ownership' of land, to
enhance the provision of public housing in solving the squatter
problem. One would not doubt the fact that what has been
dominating the housing policy development in Hong Kong has been,
and still is, the peculiar landownership system which is a
characteristic possessed only by a colonial state structure.
2. Although one has to admit that the resettlement policy
as a kind of buying off' in moderating the tension might not be
always successful, sis the Kowloon Riot in 1956 actually showed
that the Shek Kip Mei Resettlement Estate was indeed a stronghold
for the pro-KMT faction who was mobilized to protest against the
colonial state in removing some of the KMT flags. The riot later
ended as a bloody confrontation with over 100 people died.
3. Rent control came very late in 1970. Yet the lack of
any positive measure to help the lower middle strata created a
double frustration' (Drakakis-Smith). Since on the one hand,
the improved income condition was not matched by improved accom¬
modation, and on the other hand, higher traffic cost had to be
incurred due to the new employment opportunities usually
available in the newly developed new-Kowloon.
4. Hopkins (1971) also criticizes the low quality-low
rent policy of resettlement housing that it was reflecting the
origins of the housing programmes as compulsory eviction of
squatters and their compensation by the offer of cheap housing.
Indiscriminate subsidy to the ex-squatters was unjustified
morally since the entrance to public housing was not based on
income. And a programme of high quality-high rent public housing
for the compulsory evicted would surely be politically
troublesome. And it is certainly not to its advantage for a
colonial state, vis-a-vis a national state in Singapore, to adopt
them.
5. In the housing programmes of Singapore, variety of
choices had been provided, quality of housing were well above
reasonable level.
CHAPTER 5: HOUSING POLICIES IN THE PERIOD OF
THE CAPITALIST STATE
A. 1970s- An era of reforms
The status of 1972 being a watershed of Hong Kong
housing policy development was undoubtedly marked by the announ¬
cement of the new Ten-Year Housing Programme. (Table 5.1) The
new phase of policy orientation is argued by some as the personal
contribution of the then newly-appointed Governor, Sir Murray
MacLehose (Drakakis-Smith, 1979). But a closer inspection would
reveal that although personal factor was indisputably important
in a highly centralized power system such as that in Hong Kong,
the social forces which brought about this change should never be
ignored.
Reasons for the change
After almost two decades of limited state intervention,
housing problem in Hong Kong had not been solved. 750,000
people, estimated by Pryor (1975) were still living in sub¬
standard accommodation. It added up to almost 1.5 million if we
included the residents who were still living in the original
2.2m allowance in the older resettlement estates. Although the
success of birth control had brought the birth rate into further
decline (below 2 per cent after 1970), yet the change of family
formation from large to small family, coupled with the fact that
the post-war baby-boom generation was becoming mature, still
maintained a high housing demand. (Table 5.2) Together with the
constant pressure of legal and illegal immigrants from China (and
later from Vietnam), it was unreasonable for the state not to
make positive effort to deal with the situation. But the most
decisive impetus for launching this mass housing programme
perhaps came not so much as a response to peopled urgent con¬
sumption demand for housing, but to the constant urge, made by
the industrial capitalists, to provide new developable industrial
land.
Given the acute shortage of land for industrial purpose
in Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula, the cry for new town
development scheme came els early as 1950s. Tsuen Wan and Kwun
Tong were chosen to be the first two sites for planned develop¬
ment. The success of these urban expansion projects, which were
largely driven by the initiative of the state, proved to be a
feasible model for solving the problem for the industrial
requirement of spstce. During the recovery from the impact of the
riot in '66 and '67, rapid industrial growth led by export-
oriented industrialization went underway and any lack of support
from the state in this crucial resource would impede the stdvance
of the economy. Therefore, the development of new towns in the
new Kowloon' area and New Territories seemed to be the only
viable alternative for the state.
Nevertheless, development policy in the new towns would
be totally unco-ordinated if the supply of land and supply of
labour cannot both be guaranteed. Enough supply of employable
labour would be doubtful if accommodation was not secured. Yet
under a private enterprise system, investment decisions of
property capital was totally out of the state's control.
Evidence (Drakakis-Smith,1979) shows that the private property
developers were not responsive to the needs for housing in new
towns, given that high-cost high-profit type of investment in the
original urban districts was the more favorable option for
property developers.
Experience of the Government Low Cost Housing Programme
also shows that there existed a reluctance of the low income
families to move to new towns even though it could provide more
spacious accommodation (Lee, 1980). The situation has to be
understood from the fact that under the predominance of small
enterprises, Hong Kong's labour force was very mobile and change
of jobs was very frequent. Accessibility to the pool of wider
employment opportunities was usually rated higher than the need
to have more spacious, luxurious' house. Also, under the small
enterprise system, commitment to provide accommodation by the
firms directly was rare, and largely limited to the single male
workers and consequently could not satisfy the need of families
or married couples.
Under these circumstances, the new town development
which had the provision of land as the prime objective would not
be successful if it was not somehow articulated with a population
resettlement, or labour supply policy. Therefore, the already
'profitable' new town development programme for the state, in
terms of the revenue from land sale in new towns, had to have a
'welfare' element attached, and that was, the provision of cheap
low cost housing for the working class.
As a whole, the massive housing provision in the name
of welfare benefit for the people could indeed be read as a
'quasi-compulsory migration policy1 which was trying to
guarantee the supply of working force in the new frontiers of
industrial development. The strategy was deemed necessary, not
just determined by the shortage of land in physical sense, but
also by the particular economic development pattern Hong Kong had
adopted. Thus, a thin end of the wedge on the non-intervention-
ism came into being without either political confrontation or
recovery of conscience, but as a logically viable outlet to
overcome the obstacle facing the need of accumulation.
The above is not to argue that state policy making
power was expropriated by the capitalists in the service of the
capital accumulation. On the contrary, it was totally in the
interests of the state to enhance the production of land and the
development of new towns. On the one hand, this alliance of
interest between the state and capital can be comprehended by
Offe's argument that the states interest lies in the success of
the capitalist accumulation (i.e. the 'dependency criterion of
the capitalist state) (see also O'Connor,1973) for state revenue,
tax income, etc. On the other hand, this economistic argument
was particularly true in Hong Kong since land sale had always
been itself a highly 'profitable business' for the state. Chan
(1S77) has calculated that from 1955-72, the total non-recurrent
expenditure of public works done in the industrial zone of Kwun
Tong amounted to $50 million. But the value of land auctioned
in the same period in Kwun Tong Reclamation was as high as
$120 million (excluding outstanding premia, land not yet
auctioned off, and taxes).
Thus, in this respect, housing provision and new town
development was an area in which the interest of the state and
capital were highly in congruence, although the property capital
has been disgruntled by the later expansion of the Homeownership
Scheme because the government intervention in this area is
displacing their source of profit.
Administrative Reforms
The Ten-Year housing programme was very ambitious and
the organizational change made necessary was tremendous (Morris,
1978). Targets had once been set to rehouse 1.8 million people
in ten years time with permanent, self-contained homes with good
amenities and reasonable environment. A new unified body for the
management of this huge production project was thus needed.
Therefore, a reconstituted Housing Authority was given birth.
The new Housing Authority had for the first time
brought together a wide range of interests and responsible
government officials. Among them, nearly half came from the
Urban Council which at that time was the sole body having elected
members. The responsibility of the Authority covered from
planning, building, management of public housing, land clearance,
and squatter control. Not only the Authority had got beyond the
merely advisory role of the former Housing Board in becoming a
policy making body, but it also had an executive arm, the Housing
Department, to implement the policies it made. Later in 1977, a
new division for research and planning was introduced in the
Department and regular reassessment of the housing situation was
made possible. An element of planning was then introduced.
Furthermore, these organizational changes have to be
viewed in the context of a wider change of the state's New
Territories administration. In 1974, Commission for the New
Territories was upgraded to Secretary level and the emphasis had
been put on management of government programmes in land
development. In department level, a New Territories Development
Department was formed in 1973 within the Public Works Department
to take over responsibility for the planning and co-ordination of
new town development, particularly that of Tsuen Wan, Sha Tin and
Tuen Man. All these administrative reforms had the aim of
broadening the role of the state in the 'production activities'
in the provision of land, infrastructure building and public
housing construction.
Housing Policies and New Strategies
Amidst these huge project showing the state commitment,
there were three points to be noticed. Firstly, the state's
attitude toward urban renewal remained unchanged. Housing Society
which had not been absorbed into the Housing Authority stood
alone to take over the job of urban renewal in Western District,
with even less support from the state than before. Secondly, the
state's attitude toward squatter had a slight change. 'Licensed
Areas' were upgraded as the 'Temporary Housing Area' (THA), in
which basic facilities were provided and rent began to be
charged. Thirdly, and most importantly, Housing Authority was to
run in a self-financing basis. The impacts can be analyzed in
three aspects:
(1) Funding policy: previously, the sources of develop¬
ment fund for public housing construction came either from annual
government expenditure, as in the case of resettlement estate, or
from government loan fund to pay a low land premium, as in the
case of the housing programmes by Housing Society. But now the
self-financing policy of the Housing Authority sets the long term
target to make Housing Authority independent of government
budget. Therefore, the Authority has to accumulate resource from
the rental incomes to finance further building development.
(2) Rent policy: the funding policy has great impact on
rent policy since the Authority only has tenants' rents and
incomes from commercial facilities as its financial sources. The
current practice is to distinguish the former els 'domestic'
income and the latter as 'non-domestic' income. 'Domestic' pro¬
perties are expected to balance on a cash basis, while the sur¬
plus on 'non—domestic' properties is applied to help reducing the
Development Loan Fund requirements. And because the financial
aim is to have balance in domestic section, Group A public
housing tenants have to pay higher rent to make up the deficit in
the management of the former resettlement estates (Group B),
which for political reason, rent could only be charged at a very
low rate.
(3) Housing type Location policy: since the objective
is to achieve self-financing by rental incomes and no priority
criterion has been set for the various groups which the housing
programme serves, new public housing are chiefly of the improved
high-rent high-quality and self-contained types. And because the
state would only allocate the cheap land in remote new towns
(both for the value of land and the target to develop new town),
low income families whose occupational needs are linked to the
urban areas are neglected.
This has been done in the name of providing housing
with varying sizes, quality and rental levels, to serve different
income groups. But since the objective is not to provide decent
housing with definite standard for low income families, the old
low rental-low quality type in urban districts is left as the
only choice for the poor, who are especially limited by the
burden of high transport cost. This situation is also happening
in temporary housing. Also, it comes at a very late stage when
the state really puts effort in the refurbishment of the old Mark
I II Group B housing to solve the problem of poor living
condition. But the new accommodation for the original tenants
are usually restricted, in terms of rent cost and location, and
becomes an important source of conflict subsequently.
Therefore, it is also charged by critics that the self-
financing policy has gradually shifted the range of people who
may benefit from public housing from low income group to middle
income group (Keung,1981;Fong,1986). Because it is common for
those who cannot afford the high rent in remote districts or the
more limited opportunities of employment (especially in the
initial years of development) to be trapped in the waiting list
for a long time.
Intervention by the New Capitalist State
We have in the above illustrated two things, one is the
close connection between housing provision and new town develop¬
ment during the '70s, another is the new forms and limits of
state intervention as illustrated in the self-financing policy.
We can conclude that the nature of housing policy is no longer
treated by the state as a redistributive and allocative issue but
a kind of productive activities with output targets set by the
administratively registered political demands both from the
industrial capital and the lower middle classes. The possi¬
bility of a coincidence of interests of different strata here
lies in the fact that urban expansion is vital for the develop¬
ment of Hong Kong. And given the peculiar landownership system
in the territory) the state is the only agent who can organize to
satisfy those needs. Therefore, an input-oriented bureaucratic
mode of operation in allocating land housing resource is no
longer effective and it is necessary to shift to an output-
oriented one.
Upon closer examination, this historical shift of mode
of operation has been determined both by internal and external
factors. Externally, the rapid economic growth geared by export-
oriented small enterprise strategy requires the state to inter¬
vene in wide ranging demands, from land provision to labour
supply. The adoption of the mode of direct production of land
and quasi-compulsory migration rather than others, such as tax
subsidies, housing allowance, or worker dormitory etc., has been
determined by the Crown Land system and the scale of accumulation
units.
Internally, the original bureaucratic mode of operation
has proved to be inefficient, ineffective both in achieving
industrial and social targets quantitatively and qualitatively,
therefore, more planning research is needed and thus gradually
the operation has changed to a mode more akin to instrumental
rationality. Also, given the political burden which is no longer
considered bearable in the post-riot era, internal necessity of
the state to achieve higher legitimacy has also prompted the
state to adopt an interventionist approach, particularly in and
area which is so fundamental to the stability of Hong Kong.
(This point will be further elaborated in the final chapter.)
Yet as we have shown in our analysis of self-financing
policy, the resultant force of both internal and external factors
has not yet reached a point where the basic organizational
principle, such as fiscal constraints posed by the low tax
economy, has been changed. Also, given the contradictory nature
between an anarchic free market economy and the rationality of
planned development, chaos and conflicts are expected. The
disarticulation of industrial investment and population growth in
new town public housing has caused more and more troubles,
particularly in terms of 'home-work separation when the economy
has been undergoing further change, from being a cheap labour pool
to a regional financial centre. As a result, further sources of
conflict have been created which are subjected to pressures and
further reforms in the '80s.
B. 1980s- An era of crisis
After the dramatic transformation of the ways in which
the state dealt with the housing problems in the last decade, the
' 80s also saw a great change in the scope of state housing provi¬
sion and management as well as the operation of decision-making
machine. The results of the active state intervention under the
Ten-Year Housing Programme are undeniably impressive. (Table 5.3)
Several new towns have been developed with a large proportion of
population now being public housing tenants. Yet the phenomenal
success does not prevent people from observing that there still
exists a large gap between what has actually been achieved and
what was originally aimed at.
In 1978, five years after the en-Year Housing Pro¬
gramme' had been announced, only houses for 320,000 people were
built. That is to say, a mere 20 per cent of the original target
had been achieved. Admittedly, it was largely due to the slump
of economy in the early' 70s, shortly after the announcement of
the housing programme. Yet as a critic has pointed out, (Chan,R.
,1982) the slowing down of the pace was not directly related to
the recession but a lack of commitment of the state under the
self-financing policy. Because the extent and duration of the
contraction of public housing programme was unproportionally
larger than the impact of recession on the economy. (Table 5.4)
In 1979, although the rate of building started to
recover, the state nevertheless declared a slow down because of
over-heating of the economy. (Table 5.5) Only until 1980, under
a great political pressure from the public opinion did the state
make an open commitment at a steady rate of 35,000 units per
year, 5,000 of which would be the Home Ownership Scheme units.
Therefore, the original plan for solving housing
problems in ten years has actually failed with a large margin.
However, the expectation from the public has never in any sense
slowed down. On the contrary, new demands have been elicited and
the weaknesses of the overall strategy have been exposed.
Demands and Protests
The new pressures come by and large from four sources.
Firstly, the introduction of the Home Ownership Scheme in 1976
has aroused a great aspiration of the middle class, urging the
state to satisfy their housing needs. Secondly, the failure of
the public housing programme of achieving the promised rate gives
rise to people's frustration, particularly for those living in
the Temporary Housing Areas (THA) who was recognized, when they
were resettled and licensed, to have a right to public housing in
the near future, but having to spend years and years in waiting
instead. Thirdly, owing to the expectation that the state can
provide housing for the needy, more people who are originally out
of the eligibility list for public housing have been tempted to
voice their demands. Fourthly, the 'home-work' separation
problem is aggravated under the lack of industrial investment in
the new towns (Lui, 1984;Yeh Fong,1984). This comes largely as
a result of a further change of the dominant economic sector from
manufacturing to financial service at the turn of the decade.
During the late '70s and the early '80s, all these
pressures culminated in a series of urban protests about the
existing housing policies (Table 5.6). Lui (1984) has documented
a great increase of incidences of urban protest in the period
showing that the number of protest events even reached a peak
point of 35 in 1980 (Table 5.7). At first, the protest was
sporadic, with public support drawn mainly from radical students.
Later, while protests spread by contagious effect, the spontane¬
ous nature had changed to a more organized one, especially after
the active intervention of some radical community organizations,
such as the Society for Community Organization (SoCO) in some
incidents.
Sources of these conflicts could be traced back to the
state housing strategy. Some were due to the failure to recog¬
nize a particular type of need, such as the housing need for
those ex-fishers who had been living on boats by the shore for a
long time, or the singletons who at a time were considered
ineligible for public housing. Some others were due to the
increase of rent either in public housing estates or temporary
housing areas. In some cases, the improvements of environment
became the slogan of protest for the failure of a speedy
resettlement caused great strains in the living conditions of
temporary housing or older resettlement estates.
These various types of protest originated either from
the bureaucratic management in implementing of the existing
policy, or ultimately the failure of the policy itself. And as
the administrative machinery dealing with housing issues became
more complex and cumbersome, taking on more and more needs, the
whole process of housing production by the state became a focus of
attention and a target of criticism.
Co-optation Pressure Groups
After almost ten years of upsurge of sporadic demons¬
trations and protests, the pressure groups involved also started
attempting to request participation in a higher level of policy
making. The birth of 'Hong Kong People's Council on Public
Housing Policy' (PCPHP) in 1979 witnessed this change since it
was formed by the former 'Rent Policy Action Group' which was
then composed of ten different resident groups and a few
voluntary associations. These resident groups were largely those
small formal and informal units which got organized as a result
of the previous housing protests in various districts (Tang,1981).
After the formation of PCPHP, the participation of the
grassroot residents in housing policy-making has become more
organized. By actively using mass media as the main forum for
policy debates, PCPHP has gradually earned public credibility as
the representative body of the lower class voice. Meanwhile, the
channeling of demands has become more institutionalized and the
number of events of protest by direct action has dwindled. The
state's departments would even occasionally invite them to air
their opinions on certain policies, or at least as a liaison
channel in some disputes. Therefore, a process of attribution
of public status' (Offe,1985a) was achieved by the PCPHP.
To a certain extent, the formation of these protest
groups has been helped by the state, since quite a number of them
are formed under a policy of community development, which is
endorsed by the state.
After 1967's riot, the second attempt to decentralize
the government administration was dashed. Yet the state had
started to realize there is a need to build more effective com¬
munication channels with the people. But owing to the rapid
change of the urban environment, the original community organi¬
zations such as Kaifong associations simply could not maintain
their proper function any more (Lau,1981). The original network
built between the colonial state with these local leaders did not
fulfill the need for more communication. The riot in 1967
severely testified the vulnerability of these links. Therefore,
the state set up the City District Office (CDO) Scheme in 1969.
The idea was to carry out the political and co-ordinating
functions' which had already been existing in the New Territories
(Miners, 1977). The CDO Scheme was later armed with the Mutual
Aid Committee (MAC) Scheme in 1973 to build up local organi¬
zations in urban multi-storey buildings.
The original intention of building MAC network was
mainly to strengthen the mechanisms of collecting information
which could assist the government in policy formation and was
hoped to pacify community conflicts. But as the MACs were
usually closely guided and controlled by the district officials,
the interaction between MAC residents became minimal. As a
result, they responded more to the needs of the state rather than
those of the residents. Leung,J.(1986) criticizes that an ill-
defined agenda and the absence of a clear-cut role, the lack of
resources to operate neighbourhood services, and a dependence on
government initiative and support have made MACs a very parochial
and individual-centred type of institution.
Therefore, one can see that the MAC programme by far
only functions as a kind of co-optation mechanism to recruit
elites to be appointed to area committees rather than a genuine
local organization. And therefore, it failed to control the
local unrests or air the local grievances.
Later, the introduction of community development
projects operated by voluntary agencies was endorsed by the state
in 1976. The idea was to give an official mandate to the CDOs to
work with local residents' organizations. And the Social Welfare
Department began to subvent community development projects
operated by voluntary agencies in 1977. Intention of the state
was to use their non-governmental image to provide channels for
the residents to air grievances especially in deprived areas such
as the temporary housing areas and earlier resettlement estates.
But as the traditional social work method which believes more in
promoting self-help was increasingly abandoned by some of the
social workers, confrontational situations were sometimes mani¬
pulated in order to speed up the organization process. As a
result, these projects created a number of resident groups
competing for recognition and representation with the state-
sponsored MACs. Furthermore, different coalitions among these
groups were organized during different campaigns which sub¬
sequently gave birth to the stronger grassroot organizations
instead (Leung, J., 1978). The most spectacular protest happened
in 1980 when rent increase in THAs was proposed. The large
mobilization of a sleep-in which involved over 1,000 people was
possible largely because of the presence of the community
development projects (Lui,1984).
Dilemma of the Capitalist State
The development from CDO, MAC to community building
schemes shows a history in which the state has been for the past
two decades trying to handle the problem of legitimacy in the
decision-making process. As the scope and range of state inter¬
vention in housing policies have been widened and the decision
and implementation process are becoming more complex, the attempt
to register demands or control the development of political
consciousness becomes more and more difficult. The local co-
optation, or corporatist method employed in the MAC scheme has
failed to a large extent to curb the burgeoning self-organization
of residents, only to produce a number of pro-government local
elites who are detached from the community. Yet the next step to
sponsor indirectly the community projects of voluntary associa¬
tions has resulted in further politicizing the issues unintent¬
ionally.
In all these attempts to capture grassroot legitimacy,
the state is caught in a dilemma of either using tighter super¬
vision to counteract the mobilizing work of the pressure groups,
thereby, alienating the organization from the community, or
having a free-hand to let the community group win more support
from residents in utilizing some confrontational tactics which
may embarrass the state. This dilemma has once caused the alarm
of the state to set up a 'Standing Committee on Pressure Group'
secretly, to have closer surveillance of their activities. But
after an unauthorized leak of a report compiled by the committee,
it was dissolved later under public pressure.
Institutionalization of Social Movements
The trend of politicization around housing building and
management has been aggravated since the early '80s, by the
introduction of the District Administration Scheme. In the
scheme, universal franchise has been granted to every adult
citizen to vote for candidates in a reformed Urban Council, a new
Regional Council and 19 District Boards (DB). Although the
mandate for the District Boards has originally been restricted to
the discussion of local issues and the function is only to give
advice to the state, it nevertheless signifies the first formal
recognition of the right or the citizens to participate in
policy-making. As far as housing policy is concerned, every DB
has now set up either a housing committee or a committee related
to housing. Any change in housing policy is going to be
discussed thoroughly in the District Boards.
This channel of local participation just fits the needs
of the development of urban social movement in several ways:
Firstly, after almost a decade of direct protest actions on
individual incidences, there is a great urge to change the mode
of post hoc reaction and to organize the mobilized grassroot
forces. Frustrations experienced in bargaining the minute details
of policy implementation, which often leaves little scope for
alteration, also gives rise to the tactic that pressure should be
exerted at the policy formulation stage.
Secondly, the development of oppositional political
force needs forums for the debates about central political
policies and the overall political structure. Therefore,
although effort has once been made by the state to stop the DBs
from discussing central policy, it has been forced to relax the
interpretation of the terms of reference, allowing a free discus¬
sion of central policies in every DB. Thereby, the real politi¬
cal role of DB has gone beyond being a local consultative body
but is now a battleground for the struggle between the grassroot
oppositional forces and the co-opted local elites. This has
greatly superseded the limited role in various tightly controlled
consultative committees. As Lau (1985) has put it,
the intrusion of more 'pressure group' leaders
into the formerly tranquil and acquiescent DB will
change the orientation and operational style of
the DB. and ...their influence is almost certain
to increase in the years to come,...(p31)
Thirdly, locally organized housing pressure groups gain
immense advantage in organizing the election campaigns and
mobilizing supports, at a stage when universal formal election
has been introduced only for the first time (Kwong,1985).
Therefore, in the first three elections ('82, J 85, 88), the
pressure groups which rely much on the organizational support
by these resident groups, particularly those in public housing
estates, have done relatively well when compared with other
traditional political forces, such as candidates from Kaifong
Associations or co-opted pro-government elites in many urban
constituencies (Lau,1985). And, as in the case of Tuen Man, they
have even won over some of the rural well-entrenched political
force in New Territories. (Tables 5.8-5.10)
Given the lack of resources of these pressure groups,
the particular political-ecological setting in these housing
estates is undoubtedly helpful in winning the election campaigns
run by candidates from grassroot level. Although no comparison
can be made with the hypothetical case where election is held on
a city-wide basis, the performance of the grassroot pressure
groups, which are now well entrenched in public housing estates
and temporary housing areas, undoubtedly has wider influence in
Hong Kong political life.
More importantly, an operation of election politics has
created feedback effects on the mobilization of political
awareness among the residents. The newly mushrooming 'district
concern groups which aim mainly at supporting the platform of
radical DB members become prevalent in districts characterized by
concentration of lower class in public housing estates.
All these newly mobilized political forces in housing
issues have come to a great test both on the debate about housing
policy in 1984 when the state issued 'A Review of Public Housing
Allocation Policies: A Consultative Document for public
consultation, and the subsequent battle around the Green Paper
entitled 'Housing Subsidy to Tenants of Public Housing' in 1985.
Although these consultative documents have not conferred power to
the pressure groups to veto the proposals, a severe battle of
public opinion has been launched.
Claim Reduction further Politicization
What interests politically in these unprecedented
consultation on housing policies is the widespread use of 'social
scientific rationality in winning the legitimacy and support from
the public. Opinion survey method has often been used by the
state to counteract the voices of organized housing pressure
groups. The aim is to reveal and mobilize the 'unattended'
opinions of the non-public housing residents, to contravene what
is considered the 'biased' view of the vested interests,
particularly on the issue of reducing state subsidy to the rich
tenants.
During these campaigns, scientific authority image as
represented by some members of Housing Authority who have
academic background have also been utilized. Massive data and
figures have been employed to illustrate the level of state
subsidy which have already been committed. While all these were
inconceivable in the past decades, it thus has marked a further
change of the stated mode of claim reduction1 in the new era.
The political nature of this operation is what Offe
refers to as the use of social scientific criteria as 'filter
mechanisms' in the registration of pertinent demands and thus the
reduction of unsatisfiable claims (Offe,1984c). This is parti¬
cularly important in Hong Kong where the democratization process
is still largely restricted for various reasons. People are kept
outside of the central decision-making body and no political
party system can act as a 'mass integration machine' comparable
to that in advanced capitalist countries. Institutional
mediation between the state and the individual is weak (Lau,1982)
and the legitimacy of the state is always challenged by the
popular 'conspiracist conception'.
This problem of legitimacy is further aggravated in the
'80s by the complicated political situation overshadowed by the
negotiation between Britain and China about the future of Hong
Kong and, later, the coming handover in 1997. Suspicion of the
state being prepared to unshoulder its responsibility has been
widespread. In such circumstances, the task of consensus-
building for the expanding production activities of the state is
deemed more difficult while it is more needed. Therefore, the
state can only rely more and more on the 1 neutral' means to
convince the people that the policies proposed are actually fair.
Reprivatization strategy as another mechanism of
reducing claims has also been adopted. Although given the
already limited range of welfare provisions the state has commit¬
ted to, there actually is not much to privatize. Yet the state's
determination to halt the growth of the proportion of directly
state produced rental housing is strong. In place of that, more
emphasis has been put on the expansion of the Home Ownership
Scheme which produces houses for sale. The Private Sector Parti¬
cipation Scheme (PSPS) has also been proposed. The whole
strategy is to revert the we 11-conceived principle that the state
is responsible for directly producing houses for the needy.
Coupled with the recent proposed low interest loan scheme, the
state mode of housing provision has gradually shifted back to a
commodity principle that the satisfaction of housing demands
should be regulated by the market, which is thought to be more
consistent with the operation of the capitalist economy.
Although the trend still shows no sign of possibility
to revert back to a totally laissez-faire situation, an
ideological contestation about whether the land allocated by the
state to public housing construction should be treated as a
subsidy, which is reflected in its full value of market price,
has been the centre of debate around public housing rent policy.
This issue directly influences the overall level of rent charged
to the tenants as well as whether relatively well-off tenants
should be charged higher rent. This dispute has centered on the
presupposition that the state has already 'subsidized too much'.
And in the recent arguments over the long-term rent policy, the
attention has been focused on whether more weight should be put
on the 'comparative value of individual estates' or 'the amount
that the tenants can afford to pay'.
While free-marketeers would simply see both land and
housing are nothing but types of salable commodities, the wel¬
fare advocates would regard keeping minimum standard of living of
the citizen the responsibility of the state. Some of these
polemics have real economic consequences, such els the criteria of
determining the rent level, while some others, for example the
actual size of state subsidy 'already committed', have not. At
some points, these debates seem rather philosophical or even
trivial, but they actually bring out the important ideological
dimension of the whole issue of housing provision. And also, the
political significance of these debates cannot be located if they
are not considered as battles against the trend of the state in
using 're-commodification' as a way to head off the overburdening
demands, particularly at a time when the state's 'steering
capacity' is in deep trouble. The result of these debates can
actually set the limits to which the state can control and censor,
the flooding incoming pressures by explicating the principles
under which future claims are legitimized. The failure to guard
off the non-commodity principle would mean a deeper crisis of the
capitalist state. Therefore it is anticipated that in the late
'80s and probably in the coming era, these kinds of debates would
set the basic tones of urban politics in a more institutionalized
and more politicized way.
Notes:
1. Some Marxists (Castells,1977;Lojkine,1976) who claim
that contemporary urban issue is that of collective consumption
and predict the irreversible trend for the state to intervene.
This view simply fails to appreciate that under different
circumstances, the status of a particular goods els collective or
private one can be a disputable matter. The degree of
collectiveness' of housing is not determined by its nature but
by the political struggles and re-negotiation from time to time.
Furthermore, it is the results of these re-negotiations which
determine the mode and extent of state intervention and how urban
politics is conducted, but not vice versa.
CHAPTER 6: HOUSING POLICIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN OVERVIEW
In the analysis presented in the preceding chapters, we
can see that the polity in Hong Kong has undergone a great change
from a colonial state to a capitalist state at the turn of '60s
and '70s. Obviously, the change has brought important impli¬
cation to the political life of Hong Kong people. The underlying
causes and significance of this change can only be revealed by a
historical analysis of the social and political situation in Hong
Kong.
A Belated Decolonization
One of the most dramatic impacts of the World War II
was the disorganization of the British empire. Colonies such as
India, Malaysia, Burma gained independence shortly after the war.
This global de-colonization process was brought about by a series
of factors. Waves of anti-colonialism, American pressure to
liberalize the world market, change of British political
climate... all brought the old abrasive colonialism to a halt.
The remaining colonial governments, such as that in Hong Kong,
were actually a kind of 'colonial state without colonialism'.
And it was under this circumstance that the dilemma and tran¬
sition of the state of Hong Kong took place.
Before the '70s, the structure of the colonial state
was more or less the same as before. However, brutal oppression
such as that happened in the 1925 'Canton-Hong Kong General
Strike' was prominent by its absence. Strategy of the colonial
state, as we have shown in the study of housing policies, was a
kind of uncommitment, which seemed to aim rather at a 'do-
nothing '-ism before de-colonization rather than some explicit
projects or goals. Bureaucratic chaos and insensitivity to the
local needs made the housing policy a mess. Out-dated policy of
lease renewal, sluggishness in the introduction of urban
planningcontrol system, irrational obstacles posed upon the
development in urban fringe... all of those were presented as the
problems of having a state which was not responsive to the local
community.
However, process of decolonization of Hong Kong had
never really got into stride before the '80s. While here is not
the place to discuss the causes of this delay (but see Miners,
1977;Ng,1981), this peculiar historical circumstance has caused
serious impacts upon the subsequent political change, parti¬
cularly with regard to the nature of state autonomy which the
state has been possessing up till now.
Lack of Anti-Colonialism State Autonomy
Perhaps the most dramatic impact of the peculiar post¬
war political situation was the lack of anti-colonialism in a
colonial regime. The lack of explicit anti-colonialism was
undoubtedly enhanced by the factional conflict between the
communists and the KMT (i.e. the Nationalists)• This conflict,
which occasionally caused unnecessary confrontation and even
terrorist bloodshed, was particularly significant in the split
among the trade union movement, and the situation was indirectly
inducive to the kind of pro to-legitimacy enjoyed by the colonial
state. By appearing as an autonomous neutral force and the
source of law and order, the colonial state could easily exploit
the situation in shrouding the racial conflict and the bureau¬
cratic corruption which remained as residues of the colonial
rule.
The absence of an anti-colonial political line blurred
the nature of any social unrest and aims of social struggles, and
gave rise to a lasting political disillusionment in the ideolog¬
ical field. While under the ideological hegemony established
after the' 67 riot, this phenomenon has been widely read as the
innate political passivity of the Chinese people, yet it remains
as a fact that this was resulted as a specific historical product
itself. For the labour struggles in post-war'Hong Kong have
never clarified for themselves whether anti-colonialism or anti-
capitalism (or even anti-communism) should be their main goal,
the ideological confusion actually pre-empted the growth of any
mature political consciousness. And it was under these circum¬
stances that the tragedy of 67 riot was resulted. While 66
Star Ferry protest hinted an widespread social grievances, the
67 riot resolved to an opportunistic bid. Terrorist tactics
employed by the leftists resulted in no substantial help from the
socialist motherland', nor had it speeded up the pace of re¬
union drive. But the most important effect was undoubtedly the
political backlash it aroused. It was under which a crisis of
colonial rule was escaped and the ideological hegemony in the
next decade was secured.
What the state had successfully achieved after the riot
was the seizure of the chance to rebuild its basis of legitimacy.
And it was against this background that the series of
administrative reforms were launched. Therefore, we can notice an
explicit political concern in housing policies, where the impact
upon social stability was most easily discerned. As the then
Governor Sir Murray MacLehose plainly put it:
the inadequacy and scarcity of housing... is one
of the most constant sources of friction and
unhappiness between the Government and the
population. It offends alike our humanity, our
civic pride and our political good sense... it is
not a situation which we can accept indefinitely.
(Speech to the LegCo.,Oct.,1972),
the political urge to pacify social grievance by the provision
can in no place been made clearer. It also marked the underlying
the principle of the state reform in other fields as well.
Alternatives to the Colonial State Laissez-faire
While one may query about why a colonial state should
seek legitimacy in a 'borrowed time, borrowed place, one thing
which must be made clear is that the choice opened to the polity
was actually not wide. While the old colonial structure inhe¬
rited from the preceding stage had been proved to be ineffective
and corruptible, internal and external pressures had mounted up.
The most consistent pressure on the then Colonial Office came
from the British Parliamentary backbenchers, who were very keen
at unveiling the government's wound. Appalling housing condition
and child labour were among their favorite targets. These
pressures singled out as the rare remaining influence of British
politics on Hong Kong. As Ng (1981) has put it,
It was not until the riots in 1967 that London
abandoned its indifferent and complacent attitude
towards Hong Kong. The need for change was
recognized both in London in Hong Kong. (p262)
also,
The Labour Government was under pressure from its
own backbenchers to press for reforms in Hong
Kong, while the government of Hong Kong promised
reforms in the heat of mobilizing public support.
There was considerable talks both London and in
Hong Kong of the Government 'seizing the
initiative', 'closing the gap' between itself and
the people, and of the pressing need for
legislation in the sphere of industry and labour
relations. (p270)
the 'internal pressure which came from London was formidable.
While the needs for reform or seeking political alter¬
native was obvious, the reasons for the change coming about as an
administrative rather than a political reform were more compli¬
cated. The preparation for the Hong Kong decolonization was
finally held up as the result of the reluctance of the Chinese
government to solve the issue in the near future. Therefore,
Hong Kong could not have its own path of decolonization which are
usually accomplished in a decentralized and localized political
reform. Therefore, the reform could only be confined to that
aims only at building up efficient administrative machinery
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The choice of this strategy were also taken for the
fact that it was the sole political programme which was accep-
table to the capitalists who had been successfully adopted to the
competitive environment and had been making advantage of the
laissez-faire policy. The lack of room for the emergence of a
'national bourgeois and the subsequent influx of foreign
capitals also made a 'fair competitive 'rule of game a must.
Therefore, a policy of uncommitment which was originally a
reflection of the passive attitude of a 'miscarried-decolonizing
state had gradually transformed into a consensus of the capitals
in guarding off unfair competitions and the pressures from the
working class. The 'hegemonic project1 (Jessop,1983) centred
around the notion of 'Laissez-faire1 had became the consensual
ground cherished by the capitals, while the state had been dele¬
gated the inevitable task to become an efficient but distanced
arbiter in the capitalist economic development, and thus comp¬
leted a silent and gradual transformation of the nature of the
state.
The persistence of laissez-faire as an organizational
and policy principle which served the state in its post-war
colonial period, as well as the new capitalist period, was also
historically determined by the specific 'accumulation strategy
which had evolved in the last decade. The characteristic export-
led small enterprise strategy had long thrown the indigenous
capital into an competitive international environment, the
complete external orientation rendered the protection of infant
industries and state guarantee of people's consumption power
irrelevant. Therefore, state intervention in economic sphere
seemed being only a net loss of the small scale capital whose
profit margins were usually small. Also, for the established big
corporates such as those in public utilities production, where
their monopoly interests had already well entrenched in their
connection with the colonial structure, they would also not
welcome an interventionist approach, which often mean higher
public accountability and, thus, profit squeeze.
Legitimacy Social Intervention
But on the issue of social relation, the consideration
was different. Firstly, the newly transformed capitalist state
had to win the support of the citizens. In face of the severe
problem of daily life and the growing feeling of relative depri¬
vation brought about by the rapid economic development,
legitimacy could not be won other than by material concessions.
But within the fiscal constraint posed by the low-tax laissez-
faire strategy, whole-scale welfare provision was not possible.
But with the help of a similar urge for state intervention to
provide land and space for industrial development in the new
towns, massive housing programme, financed by land sales, fitted
well into the overall strategy (Table 6.1). Thereby, concession
in housing provision could appear not as the result of the
struggle between labour and capital, but as the direct compromise
between the state and the citizens themselves. This explains why
the housing provision has singled itself out as a seeming odd in
the apparent laissez-faire regime. And it is by these type of
limited social intervention and the help of 'social accommo¬
dation of politics (LauHo,1980), generated by the ideological
hegemony in terms of political powerlessness, that the 'new
capitalist state, has enjoyed a kind of 'probo-legitimacy' which
sustains the people1 s acceptance of the present rule.
Intuitive humanistic approach (e.g. Drakakis-Smith,
1979) would see the change in 1972 housing programme as more or
less a tvake of the welfare conscience brought about by an arbit¬
rary chosen career diplomatJ, Sir Murray MacLehose. Many dog¬
matic critics who are still lingering on the commonsensical
conspiracy theory see no real difference between the '70s and
before. What they both have failed to do is to locate the change
of housing policies in the wider perspective of the post-riot
establishment of the new 'hegemonic project' (Jessop,1983)
launched by the state which had just narrowly escaped the major
challenge to its legitimacy in 1967. Therefore I argue that only
by putting the interest and needs of the state itself sis the
centre of focus can one fully understand the relationship between
capital, labour and the state in Hong Kong. While interest and
needs of the state in Hong Kong appeared in the post wan colonial
period as the distanciation from the community and the benefits
in land sales, the legitimacy and mass support was now becoming
the main concern. What remains indistinct in appearance is that
the reform could only be confined to the administrative restruc¬
turing. Thereby, legitimacy was not won by democratization or
power devolution but by a successful performance of the adminis¬
trative machine.
Transition Rationality
Commentators had usually pointed to the fact the
original ten-year housing programme missed the targets consider¬
ably because they were over-ambitious and miscalculated their
estimate upon a series of factors such as the subsequent waves of
immigration (Keung,1984; Fong,1986). Yet what they have lost
sight of is the fact that the confusion, chaos and inexperience
was just signs of the inevitables resulted from the change of,
gear from one to another type of rationality.- The failure can no
longer be understood in purely technical terms. What is of prime
significance of this transitional period is that the state had,
as a response to this crisis, undergone a change from engaging in
allocative activities' to productive activities'. Yet as Offe
has pointed out {see Chapter 3), the state as an organization is
in principle restricted from fully adopting a-perfect instru¬
mental rationality as that is possible in a firm.
The qualitative shift of strategy was characterized by
the change from bureaucratic rule-following to a purposive-
rationality and the input-oriented passive calculation of
resources was giving way to the output-oriented active achieve-
ment of targets. Therefore, while the colonial bureaucratic
state could, as in the '50s and '60s, easily follow its original
non-interventionist principle in handling the allocation of urban
land resource, the building of a number of new towns and the
implementation of a massive housing programme were faced with
serious difficulties in mobilizing resources which were not
already in the hand of the state.
As Offe (1984d) has pointed out, by virtue of their
powers of (non-)investment, different elements of capital can
define and limit the boundaries of 'realistic public planning
and administration. The guiding criterion of private control of
production for profit is not easily subjected to external con¬
trols. Therefore, the attempt by the state to 'fine-tune' and
co-ordinate the economic and socialization subsystems is typical¬
ly marked by an excess of failures and unplanned outcomes. The
basic contradiction between private ownership and planning
rationality are in principle unsolvable. Resistance from the
private accumulating units and lack of co-ordination between
various state bureaucracies pose limits to the purposive-rational
planning by the state. As Keane (1984) has put it,
...the welfare state has to refrain from planned
interventions within the privately controlled
accumulation process, upon whose cyclical dynamics
and disruptive consequences this state's planning
and administration continue to depend. (p. 21)
In Hong Kong, new townpublic housing planning has
suffered from this basic contradiction. In the early '70s,
housing provision planning was hampered by the fluctuation of
general market condition, and in the late '70s and '80s, the rise
of financial dominance and change of employment location causes
serious 'home-work separation problems which are beyond the
state's ability, particularly under laissez-faire principle, to
control (Yeh,1984). These basis incompatibility of different
organizational -principles of different social subsystems are the
root causes of the problems, therefore, they cannot be treated as
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Class Nature, Autonomy the 'New State'
The 'new state' emerged in the MacLehose era was a
capitalist state in its full sense. Contrary to what the instru¬
mentalist believes, capitalist state does not need to be directly
controlled by the capitalists. In this respect, although both
Legislative Council and Executive Council are largely the
representative bodies of the big businesses, the operation of the
bureaucracy are basically autonomous, in the sense that these
linkages between the state and the capitals entails no power
being devoluted from the bureaucratic machinery to the capital¬
ists.
On the contrary, one of the main feature of the new
regime was that it can continue to revive the British tradition
of colonial rule to co-opt and arbitrate, transforming the old
'divide-and-rule' strategy to serve the contemporary capitalist
development's needs. Therefore, capitalist representation in the
two councils can be understood as an specific form of corporatist
arrangement to secure part of the consensus in the high level,
yet the overall strategy of grassroot consultation and co-opta¬
tion networks serve the purpose of consensus-building at the
other end of the social spectrum. Thereby, the state can en.joy
legitimacy in sustaining an autonomy from various societal
interests, by overlooking the overall requirements of capitalist
accumulation by planning and co-ordination, as well as bargaining
4-VrooroccqpnnopQQi nn ~t~.o tiVip working 0I3.SS•
But planning failures frequently exhibited by the state
administration in Hong Kong illustrate a common feature of con¬
temporary capitalist states, Instead of being an ideal collect¬
ive capitalists' to self-consciously arrange their economic and
socialization subsystems, delivering planned gains to selected
beneficiaries at the expense of selected losers (Keane,1984,
p22), the state can at best be described as a coherent complex of
measures guided by synoptic calculations.
Also, the structural selectivities which guarantee the
class nature of the Hong Kong's state lie not so much on the top
level lobby in the two largest consultative bodies. Rather, they
depend on the set up of the whole bureaucractic machine in
facilitating the smooth functioning of the general commodi-
fication process. As Offe (1984d) has put it,
the capitalist state is efficient and effective
not by its own criteria, but to the extent that it
succeeds in the universalization of the coiranodity
form.
In the case of Hong Kong, regardless of whether it functions in
allocative activities or productive activities, acting more as a
colonial state or els a capitalist state, the operation is still
largely initiated and controlled by the bureaucracy in facili¬
tating the expansion of capital accumulation process. It is also
this fundamental requisite which determines the class nature of
the state of Hong Kong.
Although it is correct to say the state in Hong Kong is
autonomous by being distanced itself from the societal partial
interests, neither has it become a neutral policy-making machine,
opened for contestation from different strata and groups. On the
contrary, opportunities for citizen participation is not in any
sense equal to all. As a matter of fact, every channel to parti¬
cipate is carefully designed, sometime even controlled and mani¬
pulated by the state. Under the emerging new requirements of
capitalist development and the constant redefinition of societal
needs, every effort has been made to ensure that the inputs
demands raised are responsible and under control. The strategy
is firmly held at maintaining the conditions to propagate
'prosperity stability the synonym for capital accumulation
and the corresponding political guarantees.
In Hong Kong, attribution of public status to the
selected interest groups discussed by Offe in the context of
corporatist politics in advanced capitalist countries has extend¬
ed to the level of individual co-optation. 'Administrative
Absorption (King, 1975;LauHo, 1980) as the dominant mode of
political regulation is the penetration of the state into the
civil society by means of wide-spread co-optation practices.
Political filtering exists at every level of the consultative
machines. These types of political cushioning adopted in the
past colonial period gained more dominant role when the use of
repressive apparatus deemed outdated in the new era. Also, by
being a principal strategy of political regulation, co-optation
has evolved into being a basic framework of political reform
recently proposed in the 'Basic Law.
Upon a review of the state policies over the past
decades, it shows that the reason which enable the achievement of
this role as capitalist state lies in the very ability of the
state to remain autonomous in facilitating social integration
under a particular capitalist accumulation strategy, namely,
export-oriented small enterprise one. The colonial state has
adopted itself to the situation and developed a particular mode
of administrative operation, in distinction from that of the
previous time, to fulfill the necessary criteria of being a
capitalist state in a historical pertinent way. Rapid economic
development and relative political stability has manifested as
the success of this capitalist state. Thereby, the state of Hong
Kong could achieved what most other under-developed countries
have been striving to obtain. While in the later cases, it
results in varying failures and successes, but is often done
under the name of nationalism with military oppressive rule.
Housing Provision Legitimation Crisis
Yet as our analysis of the Hong Kong housing policies
development shows, this model has not got rid of problems. The
qualitative leap from allocative to production activities in
housing provision inevitably problematizes the undemocratic
structure. Housing demands have been incessantly mobilized with¬
out the corresponding formal party and election system acting as
an integrating machine. Therefore, new needs are forthcoming
under a never settled crisis of legitimacy. On the one hand,
scope of state responsibility in satisfying housing as well as
other needs has been widened more or less arbitrarily, while on
the other hand, new definitions of basic rights are constantly
raised. Thus, under the trend of the erosion of docile mass
support which the state can rely on in the past decade, the
inability to satisfy the aspirations, particularly under the non-
interventionist strategy, would in the future augment the problem
of 'ungovernability' which has already been underway.
The basic requisite for the capitalist state to govern
successfully in Hong Kong is to a substantial extent the ability
of the state to deliver material concession to the laboring
class. In most of the advanced capitalist countries, growing
state involvement in economic regulation has transformed the
struggle between classes into a kind of 'political class
struggle' (Wright,1978) While in Hong Kong, the immaturity of
transforming capital-labour conflict into trade-union movements
further enhance the prominence of the role of the state. While
material concession has been very important in sustaining the
legitimacy of the state of Hong Kong, the influence of ideolog¬
ical support has been effectual by default. And around the few
years Then the diplomatic negotiation about the future of Hong
Kong was taking place, the state of Hong Kong enjoyed an unprece¬
dented support from the people. It seemed as if the continuation
of the present form of political status was to the most benefits
of Hong Kong, and the only one who could defend this interest was
the Hong Kong government.
Yet after 1984 when the sovereignty issue had been
solved, the steering capacity of the state has been seriously
hampered by the overshadow of the coming take-over. The general
effects of the '97 issue upon the state operation is the quantum
jump of politicization to a level which the state has ever pre¬
pared to maintain. Previous conceived principles are under
severe and sensitive scrutiny from the public, new proposals are
treated with suspicion. Demands for further reform are mushroom¬
ing from every corners of the society.
Admittedly, it was brought about by a sudden change in
the environment which was beyond the expectation of the state,
yet the dynamic of change, namely, the increasing politicization
of state administrative structure, were well underway especially
in the late '70s. The current popular blame on the 1 China
factor', though with some truth in explaining the pace of politi¬
cal change, is but one of the manifestations that the state is
going to be more dependent on ideological mobilization to upkeep
the feeling of nostalgic romanticism of the 'good old days' in
order to maintain the draining peoples loyalty to the transi¬
tional government. As Lau (1980), in commenting on the state's
strategy to curb the politicization process, has already pointed
out in 1980 that the use of further administrative penetration
into the grassroot
will, in the long run, be more costly, as it will
force the government willy-nilly into a situation
wherein substantial transformation of the
political system has to be made (p5)
Offe's analysis is particularly interesting in this
point where he says that mass loyalty or normative appeal is
perhaps the last resort for a state to increase the steering
capacity. Maynard-Moody et al. (1986) also point out that
symbolic actions are important ingredient in administrative
reform. While many have seen that Symbolic conflict' is going
to be prominent, Offe's view further points out that although
steering capacity may be increased by normative mobilization in
short run, it, nevertheless, would draws the state into further
trouble by the violation of the principle of keeping the
economic, political and normative subsystems apart. The failure
to achieve that can only mean a deeper crisis of legitimacy in
return.
Moreover, 1China factor1 is not a coherent ideology.
Ambiguous and contradictory interpretations of the symbolic value
concerning the drive to re-unification would pose as a major
splitting factor in ideological mobilization. The rupture of the
past hegemony achieved sis a result of peculiar historical contin-
gency foreshadow an era in which the sustenance of legitimacy is
at stake.
Also, as the result of the negative subordination of
normative subsystem achieved' in the past decades, in terms of
the successful anomic depoliticization, the 'amoralism' of Hong
Kong people has been particularly helpless in fabricating any
value system which can integrate the mass by normative appeal.
As Daniel Bell (1979) has pointed out, the absence of any deep-
rooted morality of belief system is threatening the survival the
capitalism profoundly, the utilitarian attitude commonly held by
Hong Kong people, resulted as the 'success' of the dominance by
commodity principle, has also pre-empted the chance to sustain
the long term mass support. The tragedy of the present gover¬
nance is that not only the present anti-communist anxiety cannot
help the state to integrate the support of people, it even raises
the unachievable expectation of the mass unon the state.
Therefore, in face of the fading away of 'proto-legiti-
macy' enjoyed over the past decade f the choice for the state of
Hong Kong seems limited to the constant administrative-rational
reforms. But since the legitimacy is not a genuine consensus
which is based on common value and the processes to entrust
power, the credibility of the state has up till now been relying
on the ability to deliver and abitrate'. Public housing pro¬
vision to secure mass support after '70s is the major material
concession by which the legitimacy of the state has been main¬
tained. Therefore, if the steering capacity of the state is
constantly dwindling, it is in no way to see how that limited
legitimacy can still be comfortably sustained.
As the sector of public housing is among the largest
parts of the state interventions and is assuming an important
role in people's consumption, failure of the state to deliver has
caused political conflicts which has been aggravating the crisis
of the legitimacy of the state. The tendency of legitimacy
crisis is speeding up the drive to democracy in a bid to secure
the source of authority. And if the future political system
is still relying on the administrative ability to deliver, rather
than having mechanism, such as political party, to intermediate,
housing issues would no doubt be an important source from which
the various crises spring.
Discussion:
Corporatism the Political Future of Hong Kong
As we have shown in this study, Hong Kong still retains
a political structure which is largely the heritage of the last
century, yet it has in its own way completed a metamorphosis
process toward becoming a fully-fledged capitalist state. There¬
fore, the basic constraints faced by the advanced capitalist
countries are also problems and issues facing Hong Kong now and
in the near future. It would only be nostalgic for the conser¬
vatives to submerge themselves in the past good old days. The
political agenda now is how to build a sustainable political
framework for the improvement of peopled life. Yet as Offe's
analysis of the internal contradictions of capitalism shows, the
trend towards overburdening of state and the subsequent politi-
cization and legitimation crisis is inevitable. Since the
problems are inscribed more firmly in the conflicting rationality
of different social subsystems themselves. Therefore, it is
actually naive, if not hypocritical, to assume that one can stop
the crisis of different subsystems from spilling over from one to
another and the problems can be solved once and for all.
In Hong Kong, the problematization of state structure
in its confrontation with state function has undergone two main
period, namely, the colonial state and the capitalist state. It
thus took on a particular path in exhibiting the contradictory
tendencies of capitalism. This specific course of development
determines the characteristics of political order in face of the
recent political change. This study has singled out the specific
basis of legitimacy and its potential sources of challenge in the
future. With regard to the problem of how to get beyond the
crises, both in general to Hong Kong's capitalist development and
in particular to historical contingent environment, politically
progressive solution can only be arrived at in detailed
consideration of concrete historical circumstances which can
serve the purpose of searching for a liberating trend.
In face of the current problem of political overload¬
ing, the state of Hong Kong seems to adopt the strategy of exten¬
sion of corporatism, by which a type of consociational democracy
is hoped to be achieved (Anderson, 1977;Lehmbruch, 1967,1977).
The recent devolution of power in various policy branches,
including housing, sis well as the strengthening of the principle
'functional constituency' in various levels of the consultative
and legislative bodies, seems to confirm the existence of this
general tendency.
Yet divergent experiences in Latin American countries
and Continental European countries shows, there would be differ¬
ent outcomes and implications for this trend. On the one hand,
corporatism has arised in western Europe as a response to the
growing ineffectiveness of the old political party system, there
the plausibility of using corporatist arrangement to substitute
party system is in great dispute. (Lembruch, 1977) On the other
hand, in the Latin American countries, where the state penetrat¬
ion and filtering of the organization of the civil society is
wide-spread, corporatism has become the framework of the 'bureau¬
cratic-authoritarian' state (Malloy,1977;0'Donnell,1979). While
in Hong Kong, corporatist arrangements have arised firstly as an
extension of colonial bureaucratic structure and later as a
candidate method to substitute for the party system, which is
considered by the conservatives as a threat to their hegemonic
rule.
The question of whether these reforms would leave room
for a more fundamental change in terms of introducing more
democratic elements, by introducing 'effective' bargaining
between different interests, depends ultimately on a series of
factors, among which the type of 'accumulation strategy' and the
modes of state regulation it needs would determine the 'margin of
maneuver' within which the nature of the political arrangements
is derived. If in the absence of a parallel representative party
system to buffer the rapid and deep-rooted politicization pro¬
cess, the problem of developing the above type of corporatist
networks is how the state can further bear the additional
challenge to the legitimacy of the administrative system it would
entail.
Western corporatist arrangement has arised in the back¬
ground of massive state regulation economy, the system has the
merit of enhancing long term planning to stabilize the fluct-
uation of short term election's concern. As Lehmbruch (1977) has
put it,
consensus-building and problem-solving in a
corporatist subsystem of interest representation
depend on a rather low level of conflict intensity
because of the high threshold imposed by (de facto
or do jure) unanimity rules which are essential to
its functioning.(pi22)
and therefore, he predicts that,
if there exists a high level of conflict (in
particular on 'redistributive' issues), it is
probable that the party system possesses a greater
capacity for consensus-building since its
flexibility is greater and thresholds of consensus
are lower.(pi22)
Since its capacity for consensus-building is limited, Lehmbruch
concludes that it would be unrealistic to consider corporatism
as a realistic alternative to representative government and the
party system.
Judging from the objective environment of Hong Kong, if
one is no longer being obfuscated by the myth of innate political
passivity of the Chinese people, as a result of the refusal to
admit the past 'accommodation' as a historical ideological product,
one would seriously doubt the present obsession of functional
corporatist idea to build the future SAR government by getting
around a democratic party representative system would not further
aggravate the over-politicization problem in return. As Anderson
(1977) has put it,
Corporate systems of representation are not
inherently incompatible with democratic practice.
The position that only a pluralist conception of
group process and interest representation is
appropriate to democratic order is not tenable.
However, to be consistent with democratic practice,
corporate schemes of interest representation have
to meet certain explicit criteria of institutional
design.
Obviously, the problems of making criterion of
representation is far more complicated a problem than that it is
designed to solve. In the absence of credible authority in
setting this criteria, it is hard to see how the principle of
inclusion and exclusion in corporatist arrangement would not be
manipulated by the already powerful as filtering mechanism to
guard off demands and preserve partial privileges.
While the problem of criterion for representation is
endemic, the crisis of legitimacy would only be the worse. One
fact about the future of politics Hong Kong is, the establishment
of Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong means the core
factor of keeping the state relatively autonomous, namely the
constitutional distanciation as a result of the inherited colonial
linkage with Britain, is bound to disappear in the future. The
historical circumstance of that peculiar autonomy is going to the
drain. In the future, the problem of maintaining autonomy from
the central government as well as from the narrow capitalist
interest is the real challenge of the state. Since historical
experiences show that it has been largely due to that sort of
state autonomy that contemporary capitalism can thrive.
The erosion of the previous proto-legitimacy is
incessantly problematizing the machinery which is making the
'political design' itself (Anderson,1977). Therefore, it is
difficult to see how inevitable politicization problem would not
be worsened in the future. The reluctance in the establishment
of the direct election system and party politics would only
reinforce the crisis of legitimacy already got underway in the
past decades, although owing to the contradiction intrinsic to
the capitalist system, any solution may indeed be part of the
problem itself.
Notes:
1• The most important change was that it gave a chance for
those who took anti-colonialism as their main goal of struggle to
realize that the option of a socialist re-unification was not
there for the years to come. Because even in the period of the
most acrimonious and bloody struggles against the colonial regime
was happening, and the political atmosphere was the most revol¬
utionary' for the Cultural Revolution inside China, Beijing
still showed no sign of preparation for a regain of the sove¬
reignty. Therefore, after the bloody riot the leftist trade
union movement lost their momentum quickly. Trade unionists
became frustrated and inert. The whole political agenda was
changed. And it was under this circumstances, the independent
trade union movement which originated mostly from state sector
came to replace the leftist movement in the following decades.
2. The strong urge for the newly transformed state to gain
legitimacy was of paramount importance to the understanding of
the Hong Kong history in the '70s. It was also evidenced in the
stated effort to curb the proliferating disease of corruption
mainly among the civil servants, especially the police force.
Along with that, racial conflicts signaled by the confrontation
between the citizens and the police force, which was manifested
dramatically in the 66'67 riots had to be cured. Therefore,
localization of civil servants and the state initiated campaigns
of 'Fight Crime1 and 'Clean Hong Kong went hand in hand to
bridge the gap of mutual understanding between the police force
and the people.
3. The policy recommendation made by Lau is to have a
substantial restructuration of the social organizational infra¬
structure at the grass-root level(p5) in order to generate a
momentum of its own to provide more and more social initiative
and resources to meet social needs.(p30) The social resources
generated is thought to be able to alleviate the administrative
overload. Yet as we see from the experience of the community
building projects, the depoliticization is not so easy to secure.
EPILOGUE:
Over the past years, there has been a growing interest
in using non-conventional or socio-political approach in
analyzing the housing problem of Hong Kong. The most obvious
achievement is the work by Drakakis-Smith's High Society: A
jubilee critique. Not only is the work comprehensive in
documentation, his humanistic critique also brings out a
dimension of research which is often neglected in academic
disciplines of urban studies. To no one's surprise, Smith's work
is more intellectually provocative and politically interesting.
However, his approach is limited by several factors:
firstly, his work is limited in its theoretical rigor. While one
can find his strength in the breath of compiling historical data,
his explanation is often arbitrary and ad hoc. Therefore, Keung
is right in criticizing him for not being able to explain what
actually shapes these government attitude... and what brings
about a change of attitude... (Keung,1981)
As a substitute to the interpretation offered by
Drakakis-Smith, Keung tries to offer an explanation which put the
'structural necessity' in light. Yet what he means by structural
necessity is still very ambiguous. By largely accepting the
specific analysis of the development of housing policies offered
by Drakakis-Smith, he simply focuses on one argument about the
Government's thirst for land for development to explain the
characteristic of housing policies between 1954-72 and attribute
the requirement for land as a 'structural necessity'. And in
explaining the overall failure of the Hong Kong's government to
distribute benefitsdisbenefits brought forth by the state
intervention, he jumps for an explanation by reference to the
failure of the economic structure and political structure. The
former is seen as the failure of the private sector to satisfy
the housing needs of the majority, while the later is treated as
the failure to reflect the needs of different population groups.
And then in explaining the dominance of arbitrary bureaucratic
decisions, he also mentions the 'political passivity' of Hong
Kong's population and the dominance of the traditional Confucian
view7.
By putting all sort of factors under a label of
'structural necessity', one would wonder what kind of explanatory
power he would like to attribute to the concept. By distancing
himself from the once fashionable notion of French structural
Marxism, especially that of M. Castells, Keung still flirts with
the notion of structural necessity while abandoning the
theoretical implications the original idea entails. However,
without explicating the interconnectedness of the relevant
elements, structure is an empty concept. And the simple piling
up of factors seems to be more akin to conjunctural variable
analysis rather than a structural approach. More important is,
while Keung is setting out to attack the arbitrariness of the
Drakakis-Smith's method in explaining the change of state's
policy, his own uncritical use of the concept 'structure' leaves
without any consistent explanation of why and how7 the same
'structural necessity' (the thirst for land) stopped to gain the
same degree of dominance in the post-'72 period. It seems that
there are two distinct 'structures' operating before and after
1972, but one still has to speculate the reasons for the
differences and change.
Equally arbitrary explanation of Hong Kong housing
policies can also be found in the work of M. Castells. In his
recent working paper entitled The Shek Kip Mei syndrome,
Castells tries to put forward an argument for the necessity of
state intervention by proposing that the economic growth of Hong
Kong is buttressed by social wage offered by the state. While
under the rubric of 1 social wage', Castells has lumped together a
number of items classified in the state budget of 'social
expenditure', such as housing, education social services.
However, no distinction has been made between those may bring
benefit more to labour consumption and to capital accumulation.
Concept for state administration is used as concept which carries
the full theoretical weight, (see O'Connor,1973) The result
would be an unfounded assertion of a functionalistic type. After
more than a decade of criticisms and debates about the function¬
alistic weakness of Castells' structural Marxism (see Saunders,
1986), he himself has already admitted the shortfall of his
original approach (Castells,1985). And in his recent work
(Castells,1983) on urban social movements, he has abandoned much
of the structuralist jargons, opening the way to political and
historical approach. However, it seems rather amazing that he
would regurgitate the same methodological error, abandoning even
the rigor in his original theory, in his recent study in Hong
Kong. It seems that without an overhaul of methodological
thinking, functionalism would always come back from the back
door.
Worse still, his argument is very feeble since he can
not even produced a coherent picture of hOK.housing subsidy
actually has helped the economic growdh. Since he seems to agree
with Drakakis-Smith s observation that the situation at 1971 was
that 'while economic growth was reaching historical records, the
city was still unable to house its people(p34) and admit that
after 1972 the new ten-year housing programme 'missed its own
target by 50%(!)(p45), but he still writes in few pages later
that mainly through housing programme, 'social benefits received
by the majority of the population are even higher than the
benefits provided by the state to U.S. workers (p98). Also, it
is he who points out (p.45) that after 30 years of public
housing, there are still no public data on the social profile of
the beneficiaries, yet he would accept Leungs estimation
(Leung,W-T., 1977) that subsidy from the Government to the tenants
amounts to 70 per cent of the real wage{!) and uses it as
evidence of his social wage argument about the economic transfer
to the whole working class.
Many a critic have already argued that under a de facto
'nationalized Crown Land system like Hong Kong, to argue for
'state-subsidy in terms of provision of land without premium is
; rather dubious since the state has actually paid nothing to any
landowners. Free-market economists in Hong Kong have never been
able to recognize the nature of land price and the limit of the
valuation method adopted by the surveyors. Any one who are
acquainted with the international debate on land policies would
know that land rents, with its elaborate form land price in urban
setting, are the results of 'social betterment'. In private
freehold ownership system, which is prevalent in the world, the
huge problem of social justice is how the state can recapture the
socially created wealth which is appropriated by landownership
who has contributed nothing to the accumulation process (see
Angel,1983;Lichfield,1980). In Hong Kong, the public Crown Land
system has actually enhanced the state to achieve what is beyond
the dream of many people in the world. Also, land prices are the
result of scarcity and social betterment, surveyor's method to
estimate price of a particular land is always a micro-economic
method to estimate by comparison with the adjacent sites. While
in the situation of Hong Kong, not only important price deter¬
mining factors such as planning control are in the grip of the
government, the state is also the sole supplier of land. There¬
fore, land market cannot simply be regarded as operated by an
'invisible hand. Any argument about overall 'subsidy' level by
the state has to be shown in a macro-economic level, or political
economy. To argue that land prices are already reflecting the
best opportunity cost of benefit is indeed one-sided, if not
utterly wrong.
Review of recent urban research shows that the study of
housing policy, like other state action, should be conducted in
no way other than by locating it first in the specific historical
development of the society, then disentangling the structural as
well as the conjunctural factors which has been shaping the
emergence and appearances of particular policy. Only by doing
so, the course of policy evolution can be fully understood.
Otherwise, arbitrary assignment of factors or mechanistic
functionalism would easily come up.
The present study tries to apply Offe's approach to the
study of state policy making by identifying the historical and
structural forces operating inside and outside of the state. It
is argued that only by adopting a dialectical approach to seize
the interplay between different structures' and its assigned
functions', one may be able to avoid partial explanations and to
discover the structural limits beyond which crises lie.
Hong Kong specificity lies largely in its unique
history, urban problems also appear in a peculiar face. While
the world capitalism seems to be plunging into another major
economic crisis, the sovereignty transition in Hong Kong is
staging another political drama, therefore, rapid change of
social and political environment is in sight. While the promised
capitalistic development of our society would not be built by
starting from stretches, our future would be constantly shaped by
the legacy of the past. And one of our legacy would surely be
our urban environment and its social and political implications,
it is also on which more focus of future research is hoped to
put. Reflexive understanding of our urban history should no
doubt be an important part of our pursuit in the future for a
better life.
APPENDIX: Tables








































Source: Housing Authority, adopted from Castells (1986)
Table 4.2 Public Housing: Programme. 1964—1974
Category of Agency and Target Actual Actual
Type of Housing Unit (Persons to be Production t Production
Housed) (Persons) (Number of flats)
Resettlement Estates





















Total 2,275,000 1,250,000 224,000
Annual Average 220,000 110,000 22.000
Source: adopted from Castells (1986)








































Source: Housing Authority, adopted from Castells (1986)
Table 4.2 Public Housing Pros-ramme. 1Q64— 1Q74
Category of Agency and



























Source: adopted from Castells (1986)









(a) all occupants of squatter and licensed areas
(b) all occupants of cottage areas
(c) occupants of Resettlement estates involved
in redevelopment schemes, and for relief
of overcrowding
(d) the unsatisfactorily housed in the New
Territories towns (Tuen Mun, Sha Tin,
Yuen Long, Tai Po, Shek Wu Hui- Fanling)
(e) the marine population requiring rehousing
ashore (including boat squatters)
(f) an allowance for
(g) an allowance for relief of overcrowding due
to population growth in Government housing
estates
(h) an element for the expected shortfall in the
private sector
Source: Speech of Governor,1972,
adooted from Castells (1986)








Reset tlcment. For families displaced








None Mark I and II- communal lavatories
and washing places.
Mark III- individual water supply,
private balcony, lavatories shared
between adjacent flats.
Mark IV and V- individual lavatory,
water supply and private balcony.
Mark VI- as above but with larger
rooms to permit allocation at space
standards of 3.3 m2 per adult












For low income families
For families of
moderate means living
in overcrowded and sub¬
standard housing









$1000 or less (up
to $1250 for
higher rent units)
Cooking bench and water tap on private
balcony, individual lavatory, space
allocation of 3.3 m2 per adult
$40-$60
Cooking bench and water tap on private
balcony, individual lavatory, space
allocation of 3.3 m2 per adult
$60-$120
As for Housing Authority.' $42— $110
Source: Hong Kong Government, Commissioner for Resettlement (1955- 1972),
adopted from Drakakis-Smith (1979)
Table 5.5 Annual P roduetion nf Pnhl-ir Hmic-inn- 1 QRi clci qQ p q-z
Financial

















































































































































































































































Private Sector Participation Scheme
Middle Income Housing
Housing Society (Rental)
Source: Housing Authority, adopted from Castells (1986)
Table 5- The actual number of persons housed by those self-



























2 S, 14 2
Total
Source: Housing Authority Annual Report,
adopted from Chan, R. (1982)
713 ,935
Table 5.5 The rate of hm'lrHncr Hv +-vo Wnnen. a,,4- 4.,, ino q-
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Note! This figure is biased by the prolonged pavement sleep-in organised by the Machaihang people.
Source: adopted from Lui (1984)
Table 5-7 The development of Urban Protests and Housing Protests.
1Q_IQ8I
TTmi pinrf pTr4- a o+
Average ho,
of action






























































Note: a, A protest event is constituted by one or more actions 'which are
organised by one or more groups .of people who are affected by a
particular urban problem. And an event is recorded at the year
its first protest action takes place.
b. Urban protest is here understood as protest developing from questions
concerning housing, resettlement, provision of community facilities
and street trade, and housing protest as protest arising- from
housing problems which affect the tenants in both private and public
housiriP'
This figure is so large because of the prolonged pavement sleep-in
orp-anised bv the Machaihang fire victims.
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Source: adopted, from Lau Kuan (1985
Table 59 Performance in District Board Election, 195 Political






Federation of Trade Unions
Meeting Point
People's Council on Public
Housing Policy
Hong Kong People's Associatior

































+It is quite- common for candidates to claim multiple membership in
various groups. Only the major 'pressure groups' are included in
Source: adonted from Lau Kuan (19S5)
Grouj
Number of Number of Elected Succes:
4--» P O 4-
the table
Table 5»10 Representation of Politically-relevant Groups among
o m f) t c f r t f T?1 a4- i aw 'I OS C
Number of% of Elected D.B























tA candidate may belong to more than one politically-relevant grou
Source: adonted from Lau Kuan (1985)
Table 6-1 Revenue from Land Sales vis-a-vis Total Government
Revenue, 67-82










































Source: adopted from Castells (1986)
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